BOOK REVIEW
This Land Is Not Our Land
K-Sue Park†
“The story of our relationship to the earth is written more
truthfully on the land than on the page. It lasts there. The land
remembers what we said and what we did.”
–Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass 341 (Milkweed 2013)
“The land and the wealth that began in it still carry the shape
of history. . . . The land remembers.
But what do we remember of it? Every political contest over
claims on the land is, in part, a contest over what will be remembered and what will be forgotten.”
–Jedediah Purdy, This Land Is Our Land: The Struggle for a
New Commonwealth xvii (Princeton 2019)
INTRODUCTION: HISTORY, ERASURE, AND THE LAW
In asserting that “this land is our land” in his new book by
that title, 1 Professor Jedediah Purdy hopes to craft a narrative of
possibility and common plight that can serve as a banner high
and wide enough for all to unite beneath. The task he undertakes
in this meditative collection of essays, written in a colloquial and
often poetic tone, is no less than to sketch out a “horizon to aim
for”—for all to aim for—a vision of the future to guide the kind of
legal, social, and political change he wishes to see. 2 What Purdy
imagines is unabashedly idealistic and unapologetically above the
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Jedediah Purdy, This Land Is Our Land: The Struggle for a New Commonwealth
(Princeton 2019).
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world of concrete prescription: he dreams of “an economy that
prizes the work of sustaining and renewing the human world,” 3 a
society in which institutions would support “the flourishing of
everyone and everything would sustain the flourishing of each
person.” 4 To reach that horizon, he emphasizes throughout that
we must overcome our conflicts and divisions and prioritize that
shared vision of the future: we must reach “answers that people
can live by together.” 5 For Purdy, the land is a metaphoric resource, a keeper of history, and the literal ground of our common
condition. In those capacities, it helps him underscore that, for
better or worse, we are all here, to flourish or perish together.
In this book, which he pitches to a popular audience, Purdy
turns to the land as a means of reorienting a divided American
public toward more communitarian values and norms. In doing
so, he follows in the footsteps of such introspective environmentalists as Henry David Thoreau and Wendell Berry, and, like
them, anchors his hopeful imaginations in a critique, made all the
more urgent by the looming threat of climate disaster, of the dire
inequality and degradation of all forms of life that dominant capitalist modes of production and exchange have wrought. As he
builds his historical narrative of how we arrived at this point,
Purdy also describes the inequalities and racial violence of the
present as legacies of colonization and slavery; and he explains
that these largely “forgotten” histories 6 nevertheless have determined the shape of the landscape, the infrastructure, and the dynamics of our interactions in the present. In this way, Purdy explicitly directs his message at everyone who belongs to this
fractured populace, to call them into concerted action. This ambitious project attempts to provide universal answers to some of the
most critical yet seemingly insoluble questions of our times: How
can we cultivate communication across our differences that will
make it possible to work together in the face of existential threats
to our collective survival? How can we learn to understand one
another when the tremendously violent histories that sowed the
terrain of conflict today have been suppressed for so long and in
so many ways, such that we lack the information to know where
others, and perhaps where we, ourselves, are coming from?
3
4
5
6

Id at 148.
Id at xiii.
Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xxiii (cited in note 1).
Id at xvii.

2020]

This Land Is Not Our Land

1979

This Book Review reflects on the importance of the questions
that Purdy presents, especially for the legal academy, as well as
the shortcomings of his own engagement with them. Purdy
rightly calls for a reframing of our collective relationship to the
land and each other. Furthermore, he understands that recognizing the histories of conquest and slavery and their erasure is critical to any project that aims to unify a deeply divided public. Foregrounding this problem simultaneously invites and creates space
for a difficult but necessary set of conversations about our differences, our divergent perspectives, and the ways those histories
have shaped both. This choice is all the more commendable because it is relatively unusual in legal scholarship; underlining
suppressed historical foundations is especially rare when the focus of a work, like this book, is not itself to engage in the task of
recovering these histories. However, Purdy’s invocation of these
histories raises more questions than he answers about their connection to the stories, ideas, and experiences he shares in the rest
of the book. Further, though the book poses questions about the
significance of these histories and the problem of erasure that are
especially salient for the legal academy, it does not appear conscious of what these histories can tell us about the law and legal
institutions, nor of the specific dimensions of what doing this kind
of work entails.
By prioritizing these histories in his work nonetheless,
Purdy’s goal appears to be to raise up the concerns of broad and
diverse social movements and to bring them into the fold of his
own communitarian vision. His choice to highlight these questions feels deliberately resonant with broader messages from
global political movements of the moment. These movements,
chiefly led by youth, have popularized a range of critiques of capitalist markets, their devastation of the environment, and the intertwined histories of colonization and growth of the Atlantic
slave trade out of which those markets arose. 7 Over the last decade, and at an intensifying pace, public awareness of these histories has burgeoned, spurred by broadly publicized police and
7
Purdy also aligns himself with these movements by insisting on hope. One of his
main goals appears to be to convert the despair and abandonment of the future of cynics
and nihilists into a sense of urgency about the present. For example, he diagnoses a “creepingly nihilistic” view that “we are just waiting for the end” and concludes: “We are suffering not from ignorance or innocence but from a lack of faith that understanding can help
us.” See id at 149.
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military brutality and worldwide demonstrations following the
police murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, protest
movements in Ferguson and in Standing Rock, activist organizations like Black Lives Matter and Idle No More, and landmark
commentaries from Michelle Alexander and Ta-Nehisi Coates. 8
Indeed, in “The Case for Reparations,” Coates laid confronting the
history of slavery and its aftermath down as a gauntlet for the
future, writing: “We cannot escape our history. All of our solutions
to the great problems of health care, education, housing, and economic inequality are troubled by what must go unspoken.” 9
This rising public engagement with the past has fostered the
dismantling of more and more Confederate monuments, statues,
and plaques; 10 the end of Santa Fe’s Entrada pageant celebrating
conquest; 11 the growing replacement of Columbus Day with Indigenous People’s Day 12 and observation of a National Day of
Mourning on Thanksgiving; 13 the renaming of residential community names 14 and the revision of university seals, 15 state flags,

8
See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the
Age of Colorblindness (New Press 2012); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations (The
Atlantic, June 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/R4JJ-RDPD.
9
See Coates, The Case for Reparations (cited in note 8).
10 See Jasmine Aguilera, Confederate Statues Are Being Removed Amid Protests Over
George Floyd’s Death. Here’s What to Know (Time, June 9, 2020) archived at
https://perma.cc/3294-DC7A; Bonnie Berkowitz and Adrian Blanco, Confederate Monuments Are Falling, But Hundreds Still Stand. Here’s Where. (Wash Post, July 2, 2020)
archived at https://perma.cc/S2FK-NPSM; Confederate Monuments Are Coming Down
Across the United States. Here’s a List. (NY Times, Aug 28, 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/YT69-UCST.
11 See Daniel J. Chacón, Fiesta Drops Divisive Entrada Pageant in Santa Fe (The
Santa Fe New Mexican, July 24, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/58P7-Q9YT.
12 See AJ Willingham, These States and Cities Are Ditching Columbus Day to Observe Indigenous Peoples’ Day Instead (CNN, Oct 14, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/YS7W-7GRQ.
13 See Kelly Wynne, What Is National Day of Mourning? How Anti-Thanksgiving
Day Started and Everything to Know About It (Newsweek, Nov 27, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/3XFV-JGX2.
14 See, for example, Andy Newman and Vivian Wang, Calhoun Who? Yale Drops
Name of Slavery Advocate for Computer Pioneer (NY Times, Sept 3, 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/96HC-D67V.
15 See, for example, Abby Jackson, Harvard Law School Finally Removed the Seal of
a ‘Brutal Slaveholder,’ but Not Everyone Agrees with the Decision (Business Insider, Mar
15, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ATY6-HD92.
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school mascots, 16 and professional sports teams’ names; 17 Indigenous mapping projects; 18 a congressional hearing on reparations 19
and the creation of university reparations funds; 20 new media projects; 21 and increasing recognition of Indigenous and Black struggles across the country and worldwide. 22 The growing public conversation has also increasingly knit itself to and raised the profile
of historical scholarship that examines the ways that conquest
and slavery shaped, for example, insurance systems, 23 foreclosure, 24 credit markets, 25 investment banking, 26 and accounting
practices. 27 Last year, the launch of the New York Times’s
16 See, for example, Christine Hauser, Maine Just Banned Native American Mascots.
It’s a Movement That’s Inching Forward (NY Times, May 22, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/HA85-ZUN7.
17 See, for example, Terence Moore, Washington Redskins Name Change Makes Atlanta Braves, Kansas City Chiefs and Others Look Clueless (Forbes, July 13, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/9K3S-VTYU.
18 See, for example, UCLA American Indian Studies Center, Mapping Indigenous
LA: Place-Making Through Digital Storytelling, archived at https://perma.cc/53TH-XG2B;
David Grossman, Tribal Map of America Shows Whose Land You’re Actually Living On
(Popular Mechanics, Oct 14, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/LHR7-3BA7; Hansi Lo
Wang, The Map of Native American Tribes You’ve Never Seen Before (NPR, June 24, 2014),
archived at https://perma.cc/4Y2L-MNYS; Cecilia Keating, Indigenous Geographies Overlap in This Colorful Online Map (Atlas Obscura, July 24, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/G37L-JUPP.
19 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, At Historic Hearing, House Panel Explores Reparations
(NY Times, June 19, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/T6DK-PXVS.
20 See, for example, P.R. Lockhart, Georgetown University Plans to Raise $400,000 a
Year for Reparations (Vox, Oct 31, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/FC6Z-6P7J.
21 See, for example, Tim Baysinger, HBO Orders ‘Exterminate All the Brutes’ Docuseries
from Raoul Peck (The Wrap, Feb 18, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/C7UR-8DF5.
22 See text accompanying notes 70–81.
23 See Sharon Ann Murphy, Securing Human Property: Slavery, Industrialization,
and Urbanization in the Upper South, in Sharon Ann Murphy, Investing in Life: Insurance
in Antebellum America ch 7 at 184–206 (Johns Hopkins 2010). See also generally Michael
Ralph, “Life . . . in the midst of death”: Notes on the Relationship Between Slave Insurance,
Life Insurance and Disability, 32 Disability Stud Q (Summer 2012).
24 See, for example, K-Sue Park, Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest of America, 41
L & Soc Inquiry 1006, 1009–14 (2016). For a broader discussion of the role that mortgages
on slaves played in powering the Southern economy, see generally Bonnie Martin, Slavery’s Invisible Engine: Mortgaging Human Property, 76 J S Hist 817 (2010).
25 See generally Joseph E. Inikori, The Credit Needs of the African Trade and the
Development of the Credit Economy in England, 27 Explorations in Econ Hist 197 (1990).
26 See generally Kathryn Boodry, August Belmont and the World the Slaves Made, in
Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman, eds, Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American
Economic Development 163–78 (Penn 2016).
27 See generally Caitlin Rosenthal, Accounting for Slavery: Masters and Management
(Harvard 2018). Much of this scholarship belongs to the growing field of work on racial
capitalism, following the lead of such early prominent and influential thinkers as Eric
Williams, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Professor Cedric Robinson. See generally Eric Williams,
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landmark 1619 Project ignited a cacophony of granular debates
about the history of slavery across the Twitterverse. Its pieces explored the legacy of the slave trade in, among other things, the
evolution of American capitalist market practices and the racial
wealth gap, carceral and medical practices and institutions, culture and its appropriations, and democracy itself. 28
In foregrounding these long-buried histories in his book,
which was published just one month after the 1619 Project’s inaugural issue, Purdy both signals solidarity with these movements and presents the problem of historical erasure to legal
scholars. However, by breaking new ground, these movements
have also made clear how unaccustomed the nation still is to dealing with the racial, legally constructed violence of its present and
past. The challenge of building productive dialogue on these issues
continues to plague political movements and institutions, especially the broadly construed Left—for which Purdy speaks as a
thought leader—and the legal academy, of which he is an established part.
This Book Review examines the way Purdy, not always successfully, negotiates the challenges of understanding the consequences of erasure and building solidarity across racial divides.
From this critique, it draws some lessons: First, it is critical, beyond acknowledging these histories, to work to understand their
effects—which are not always self-evident, especially in the study
of the law. Second, as a consequence of the first point, naming
erasure is not sufficient to remediate it. And third, mentioning
diverse perspectives must be the prelude to actually attempting
to learn from them, and recognizing that a collective understanding of the past and vision for the future requires listening and dialogue. Further, this Review introduces other scholarship in order
to show that the concrete work of understanding how long-suppressed histories have shaped fundamental bodies of American
law requires reconstructing both erasures and historical narratives; diagnosing the theoretical consequences of erasure; and

Capitalism & Slavery (UNC 1994); W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America
(Touchstone 1995); Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical
Tradition (UNC 2000).
28 See Jake Silverstein, Why We Published The 1619 Project (NY Times, Dec 20,
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NZM6-2PM2. For a discussion of critical scholarly reactions to the Project, see Adam Serwer, The Fight over the 1619 Project Is Not About the
Facts (The Atlantic, Dec 23, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/4V3T-AZJR.

2020]

This Land Is Not Our Land

1983

retheorizing the law and legal development using new narratives
and perspectives.
This project, which has long remained relatively obscure and
marginal in the legal academy, takes up a critical and urgent
task—describing our common history, how we came not to know
it, and its significance for the study and practice of law. Legal
scholars will increasingly find themselves pressed to confront
these questions in this climate; people in the legal field, and especially law students, will notice and inquire about the absence
of information about these histories from legal texts and law
school curricula. Many people in and outside the legal academy
already understand that law played a key role in facilitating the
conquest of Indigenous lands and the trade of human beings, and
that these histories therefore raise special questions for the discipline and legal institutions. Legal scholars are in many ways best
positioned to illuminate the technical role that the law and legal
institutions played in those processes and the impact that this
role had on the different practices, doctrines, and institutions that
constitute our legal system today. However, doing so will require
openness to questioning what we think we already know, as well
as to rethinking how we conceive of both our methodology and our
field.
Part I outlines the challenges of studying how the erasure of
histories of racial violence have shaped our understanding of
American law and legal institutions. Part I.A describes Purdy’s
project and his efforts to unite a broad readership, which include
foregrounding the histories of conquest and slavery and their relevance for the present. By doing so, he signals his concern for contemporary issues of racial inequity and violence, yet the idea that
erasures have impeded our ability to understand these histories
as our common legacy runs contrary to prevailing presumptions
in much of legal scholarship. 29 His adoption of what I will call a
“presumption of erasure” raises questions about how such a presumption might disrupt established narratives about law that are
based on a contrary presumption—that there has been no such
erasure. Part I.B suggests that the inquiry into how the histories
of conquest and slavery shaped the main doctrinal fields of law—
for example, the subjects studied by first-years—remains
29 The one exception here is legal historical scholarship, where the quantity of work
on these topics is high.
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undeveloped. In part, it is difficult to pursue such questions because the bar for attempting to show the relevance of historical
foundations that are notably absent from the touchstone narratives in the American legal academy is high. 30 Speaking into the
space of an erasure that no one perceives frequently requires first
establishing or proving erasure as a precondition to making a positive claim. 31 This Part describes a growing mass of legal scholarship that finds erasure across a number of doctrinal areas, indicating that broad patterns and mechanisms of erasure—including
citational practices and segregation of source materials—pervade
legal literatures generally, 32 and suggesting that there is evidentiary basis for adopting a presumption of erasure.
Part II turns to the subtler, constitutive effects of erasure to
show how its consequences on understanding the law are more
than a matter of historical accuracy. Part II.A explores the conceptual consequences of erasure. Many widely accepted theoretical frameworks developed from established historical narratives
about America evaded the histories of conquest and slavery; the
30 See generally, for example, James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Wis 1956); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (Harvard 1977); Lawrence Friedman, A History of
American Law (Simon & Schuster 1973). Professor James Willard Hurst’s text provides
an excellent example of how a scholar can completely elide the history of conquest, even
while, in essence, writing about it. He begins his work with a detailed discussion of a settlers’ compact in Pike Creek, who had moved onto unceded lands claimed by the Oceti
Sakowin, Miami, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, and Peoria in anticipation of their future conquest. Yet Hurst frames the agreement they form not in terms of how such settlers constituted an informal labor force that the nation incentivized with land grants to occupy lands
held by Native Nations, but as an example of citizen-made law, freedom, and democracy.
See Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom at 3–6. See also Stuart Banner, How the
Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier 124–29 (Harvard 2005); K-Sue
Park, Insuring Conquest: U.S. Expansion and the Indian Depredation Claims System,
1796–1920, 8 Hist of the Present 57, 64–68 (Apr 2018).
31 Historical interpretation has never been a uniform or uncontentious endeavor.
However, the breach between versions of American legal history that engage with the histories of conquest and slavery and those that do not presents a distinct challenge. This
disparity creates a different order of dispute in that such differences rest not on divergent
interpretations of facts or marginally varied information, but on substantially different
fact sets. Further, the strength of such arguments determines the influence they will have
less than do the powers of habit, inertia, and path dependence.
32 Such work usually limits its claims to the boundaries of discrete fields, no doubt
in part because the work of tracking such erasures more broadly would be unmanageable.
While these patterns and mechanisms are general, the work of identifying such omissions
in casebooks, treatises, judicial opinions, and legal scholarship, as well as analyzing the
consequences of erasure and the significance of omitted material is highly specific to the
doctrine, subject, and field of practice. See, for example, text accompanying notes 84–96.
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abstract principles extracted from those frameworks therefore
bear the marks of that erasure, insofar as different historical accounts would likely have produced different theoretical conclusions about the operation of law. Interrogating the conceptual
consequences of erasures therefore means reassessing longstanding and widely embraced interpretations, if they were developed
from partial historical accounts. Different historical narratives
shape our perspectives and ideas, which, once shaped, are more
recalcitrant to change than accounts of history from which they
derive.
As Part II.B explores, it is therefore possible to formally
acknowledge these formerly erased histories without appreciating the extent to which they have shaped one’s own intellectual
outlook and mode of address. The perspectives and ideas that
Purdy acknowledges encompass one kind of erasure—the historical erasure of conquest and slavery—but omit another: the erasure of minority perspectives on these events and the law more
broadly. Consequently, though his call for a collective ethos appears to be earnest, Purdy’s ideals, attachments, and the lineages
he offers themselves reflect a failure to engage with the Indigenous call to recognize that this land is not our land. Tacking on
acknowledgments of differential distribution of harm cannot substitute for the lesson, long elaborated by critical race theorists,
that representation of and engagement with different perspectives will substantively change the shape of one’s intellectual
questions, narrative accounts, and theoretical conclusions. Insensitivity to what experiences and horizons are shared and which
are not is not a problem specific to Purdy’s book; rather, it is one
with which he and the broad left/liberal movements committed to
universal ideals must contend if they ever wish to truly build
with, and avoid alienating, marginalized groups. The ability to
discern what is universal and what is particular cannot grow from
a dearth of perspectives. Failing to include long-ignored perspectives in popular politics and primary legal narratives risks generating more “universal” perspectives that continue to suppress
the same voices even as they purport to stand in for “all.”
I. ADOPTING A PRESUMPTION OF ERASURE
This Part considers the importance of history to creating a
common narrative, both as Professor Purdy presents it and as the
work of scholars who have investigated the problem of erasure in
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the study of law reveals. Part I.A describes Purdy’s project in This
Land is Our Land, the way it aims at inclusivity by acknowledging the histories of conquest and slavery and their erasure, and
some of the contradictions between this acknowledgment and the
universal prescriptions of the book. Part I.B endorses and underscores the particular salience for the legal academy of Purdy’s
proposition that histories of racial violence inform the present. It
describes a growing body of scholarship that has tracked the erasure of these histories across many legal fields, suggesting that
that there is good reason to adopt a presumption of erasure in the
study of the law and that the mechanisms of this erasure have
constituted a fairly consistent set of citational, framing, and organizational practices.
A. Purdy’s Vision of a Commonwealth
The political ideal that Purdy recommends we embrace in
This Land is Our Land is that of a “commonwealth”—a term he
traces back to Middle English that denotes “‘the general good’ or
the well-being of the whole community.” 33 The freedom, dignity,
and health that he imagines this form of political organization
will bring depend, in his conception, on a reorganization of the
economy and a new approach to infrastructure. 34 This emphasis
on the material underpinnings of freedom and politics accords
with the emphasis on political economy that Purdy has championed within the legal academy. He writes:
No story or picture of the world matters much if it floats too
far from what people do with one another’s bodies and with
soil and weapons and other tools; but also and by the same
token, no material change in power will go forward without
ideas and images that give it shape and a horizon to aim for. 35
As more of a philosopher than a materialist—Purdy is much more
theorist than wonk—he devotes most of the content of his book to
describing the latter project of sketching the horizon through narrative example and self-reflection, emphasizing the material
stakes and motivations of our institutions. By doing so, he hopes
See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xi–xii (cited in note 1).
See, for example, id at xiv (citing Bayard Rustin’s calls “for public works and training, for national economic planning, for federal aid to education, [and] for attractive public
housing”).
35 Id at 3.
33
34

2020]

This Land Is Not Our Land

1987

to convince us that “a commonwealth is not a gauzy utopian ideal:
it is radical and practical.” 36
The tour Purdy takes us on—“how American earth has always held the people on it apart together, and how the borders at
the country’s edges and the borderlines that fracture ‘the homeland’ are linked in a single web” 37—moves through fights over
public and private lands, including Ammon Bundy’s occupation of
the Malheur Wildlife Refuge in Oregon; the Bears Ears and
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments in Utah; Appalachian coal country, where Purdy grew up; Flint, Michigan; and
Durham, North Carolina, where Purdy lived for many years while
he was a law professor at Duke. To guide us through this landscape and communicate his political vision, Purdy draws on his
own personal experiences and love of nature to bring this work
into the “self-as-story” genre that has been effectively vitalized by
writers such as J.D. Vance and Ta-Nehisi Coates in recent
times. 38 His embrace of a method of introspective philosophical
reflection also places him squarely within a transcendentalist tradition that encompasses a number of his heroes—such as Henry
David Thoreau, Wendell Berry, and Rachel Carson—in addition
to such contemporary writers as Rebecca Solnit and Marilyn Robinson. In lines that could pass as a paraphrase of John Locke’s
first and most famous statements about property, Purdy wields
this geography, form, and tradition to argue that “[t]he world belongs in principle to all who are born into it. . . . A commonwealth’s engagement with the problem of global sharing must
start from the premise that everyone alive has an equal claim to
thrive in this world.” 39
In the first essay of this collection, which goes by the book’s
title, Purdy describes the problem of “civic enmity” and presents
his central idea that the land “belongs originally and essentially
to everyone, that it is a commonwealth.” 40 The second, “Reckonings,” describes the toxic effect of industries on the people whose
livelihoods and survival depend on them in Appalachia and elsewhere. Purdy’s third chapter, “Losing a Country,” provides an
Id at xx.
Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at viii (cited in note 1).
38 See generally J.D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis
(HarperCollins 2016); Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me (Spiegel & Grau 2015).
39 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 98–99 (cited in note 1).
40 Id at 1, 28.
36
37

1988

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1977

extended meditation on his own shock in the wake of the 2016
election in conversation with Thoreau and the natural landscape.
His fourth focuses on infrastructure, the heedless and dangerous
logic behind its current growth, and the possibility of rebuilding
it to support a different way of living. The last essay offers a genealogy of “The Long Environmental Justice Movement” as a
source of inspiration. And, finally, his conclusive “Forward” addresses the need to prioritize “the value of life” rather than conceptualize value primarily through “the more precise and neutral
concept of price.” 41
Across this collection of essays, Purdy’s reflections shift
smoothly between descriptions of material conditions in the landscape he charts and such subjects as the way historical violence
has shaped American identities, the link between environmental
and economic vulnerability, the power of the built environment to
determine how we live and to shape our choices and outlooks, the
commitments that drive different political factions, and the problem of denialism. In particular, for Purdy, climate denialism is
not merely a denial of the validity of scientific claims, but an
“ethos that refuses to see how the world is deeply plural at every
scale and that we are in it together.” 42
Over this survey of our national landscape and its afflictions,
Purdy elaborates the ethic that he believes must guide a new and
egalitarian approach to constructing an economy and infrastructure in sweepingly broad terms: We must believe, he argues, in “a
way of living in deep reciprocity as well as deep equality,” not only
with one another, but with the planet. 43 “We should root ourselves,” he further urges, “in helping the world, human and natural, to go on being.” 44 Developing this relationship with the natural world and one another, Purdy recognizes, depends on
cooperation: “No one can choose these values alone because they
depend on the shared commitments of others and on the shape
and terms of a built and shared world.” 45 A world guided by this
communitarian ideal, he cautions, will require us to take responsibility for our own actions and to confront our accountability to
others: “The freedom of that community would not be freedom
41
42
43
44
45

Id at 142.
Id at 14–15 (emphasis in original).
Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xiii (cited in note 1).
Id at 148.
Id at 150.
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from the consequences of your actions. It would not be freedom
from dependence on others, or from responsibility for them.” 46
Perhaps above all, a new economy that could support this set of
relationships would require us to sacrifice ways of living that we
have come to take for granted as we “ask what wealth itself is and
what is the value of life.” 47 In the future, Purdy hopes, “value will
lie in work that does what is necessary and sustains its own conditions of possibility, in rest that contemplates a broken but still
wondrous world.” 48
The path that bridges the troubled present to this possible
future in Purdy’s account is recognizing our inescapable connectedness, and the key to doing so, for him, lies in learning the history of the land itself. To the end of illuminating that history,
Purdy not only shares stories of communities’ struggles in relation to the land in parts of West Virginia, Kentucky, Durham, and
elsewhere, but also commits clearly to the premise that conquest
and enslavement laid the foundation for colonial growth and the
very possibility of the nation. He writes that “[c]olonists ‘justified’
taking the land of Indigenous people by insisting that only settlers and farmers could properly own and rule a terrain”; 49 and
“[a]fter the land itself, the other great extraction of wealth was
from the labor of enslaved people.” 50 Further, the “cycles of boom
and bust” fueled by land speculation in “frontier land,” Purdy tells
us, “never really ended.” 51 And “[a]fter the frontier came redlining,” 52 so that “[t]he chasm between white and black wealth is
rooted in control of property, and it abides there.” 53
Furthermore, as he insists on these long-buried truths as
foundational, Purdy also squarely acknowledges that he is speaking into a void of erasure that has shaped dominant popular consciousness. Though “[t]he land remembers” the history that
shaped its terrain, he writes, we have largely lost the ability to do
the same: “[W]hat do we remember of it?” 54 He explains that these
erasures matter because they inform the claims people make on
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id at xiii.
Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xxiii (cited in note 1).
Id at 150.
Id at ix.
Id at xv.
Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at ix (cited in note 1).
Id at xvi.
Id at xvii.
Id.
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the land today: “Every political contest over claims on the land is,
in part, a contest over what will be remembered and what will be
forgotten. With forgetting, the way things are sinks into the land
itself, as if it became nature.” 55 “Forgetting,” for Purdy, has bred
national mythologies in the negative space of the histories of colonization and slavery, while continuing to facilitate violent processes targeting non-white people. Purdy spies the “ecological
echo” of Jim Crow in the “green canopy over the white boulevards”
that mark “the old color line” where historically segregated suburbs began. 56 And ongoing gentrification, he asserts, is the direct
descendant of redlining: “‘color-blind’ markets have replaced
poorer black and Latino residents with whiter and wealthier people almost as systematically as segregation once did—albeit with
more nuance and deniability.” 57
In short, Purdy locates the roots of what he later calls “our
civic enmity”—the bitter dissension that rends the American public—in the nation’s tremendously violent, suppressed inheritance.
In his introduction, Purdy pointedly outlines the sweeping impact
of this past upon the present: “[T]he history of this continent’s
past five centuries,” he writes, “is woven from fantasy on the one
hand and the relentless and often inhumane and destructive extraction of wealth on the other.” 58 Further, the great “differential
violence that molds white, black, and brown bodies to the concrete
abstractions of race and caste” 59 remains “written on the land: in
how people are distributed across it, who owns it and who can
imagine, after a few generations, that their people have a claim
that is nearly primordial and even in harmony with the expectations of the place itself.” 60 These far-reaching observations have
huge implications for precisely the kinds of projects in which
Purdy is professionally invested—namely, legal scholarship and
political ideation. The questions they raise about the fantasies of
liberal democracy—historical narratives about the country premised, as Purdy notes, on the omission of the destructive extraction
that underpinned the country’s development, and the violence
visited on racial minorities whose bodies and lands were sites of
55
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60

Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xvii (cited in note 1).
Id at xvii.
Id at xvi.
Id at xv.
Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xvi (cited in note 1).
Id at xvi.

2020]

This Land Is Not Our Land

1991

extraction—are equally applicable to both types of endeavors. To
what extent have those narratives informed our understanding of
legal and political institutions, of the political ideals we hold dear,
the horizons of our political imaginations, and our very sense of
self?
In the face of these crucial questions, and the scars of the violence that perpetuate deep inequalities, Purdy’s later prescription that what we need is to recognize that “[a]ny arrangement
for living together has both sides, and they have to be understood
together,” 61 frankly feels evasive. Elsewhere, too, he calls for
unity on a theory that seems based more on co-residence than on
the project of unpacking the profoundly troubled history that produced the schisms of today. The doors he opens to an inquiry
about the past collapse into the present, for example, when he
writes that “[t]he land exemplifies the country all too truly: it is
the site of fights over whose country is being taken away, who is
the patriot and who is the usurper or trespasser.” 62 To whom is
this claim addressed? Can Purdy be speaking to the descendants
of the people who lost their land to settlers? Is it the descendants
of those settlers? Is he attempting to speak to both at once, or to
mediate their concerns by suggesting they are equivalent? Do the
specific histories that underpin such conflicts suggest that a single answer is appropriate for “both sides”? 63 Is the observation
that “there is no agreement on the answer” to the question “how
[ ] people who live together come to see one another as enemies” 64
all we can draw from the past? The histories that Purdy laid down
as fundamental to the nation seemed to confirm that usurpation
and trespass occurred, and that there is a long and complicated
story to be told about how people in America came “to see one
another as enemies.” The ideas that “[t]here has never been
enough public space for the contending publics who want it,” 65 or
that “the things that tie people together and the things that divide
them tend to be the same things,” 66 irresolutely back away from
the lessons that particular histories have to teach us about the
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Id at 3.
Id at 9.
Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 3 (cited in note 1).
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specific common ground and sources of injury between people, especially if we could learn them together.
This tension, however, is a productive site for returning to
Purdy’s own insight that the key to resolving our conflicts lies in
recognizing—and probing—the long-buried history of the great
racial violences that produced this nation and the contours of the
land. Purdy’s difficulty in developing this analysis speaks less to
any personal failing than to the points where this public conversation very commonly stalls: What is the purpose of acknowledging these histories, and what do we gain from studying them?
How do we differently understand the United States, our place in
it, the problems that fester across it, the institutions that govern
it, and future possibilities for any of these things if we undertake
a collective examination of this common but suppressed past?
These questions have been so infrequently asked by the American
public at large that we have a generally underdeveloped sense of
how to ask them and few specific answers to them yet. So it is
hugely valuable, as Purdy does, to raise these questions in such a
way that frames the inquiry as our collective task. The next Section, Part I.B, examines the specific challenges and contours of
taking erasure as an object of inquiry within Purdy’s field—law—
before turning in Part II to subtler challenges of erasure that impact our understandings of law and legal institutions, but also
political conversations and the possibility of mutual understanding that Purdy foregrounds as critical to building solidarity and
movements on the Left.
B. Taking Erasure as an Object of Inquiry
A growing body of legal scholarship suggests that erasure of
the histories of conquest, slavery, and race is widespread across
doctrinal areas. This scholarship demonstrates that, methodologically, the work of (re)constructing how the histories of conquest
and slavery affected the development of law and legal institutions
requires both gleaning stories from the record and investigating
how they became invisible in legal scholarship, legal education,
and legal practice. These findings concerning erasure give us a
more precise understanding of the mechanisms through which
that erasure occurred, including path-dependent citational practices that reproduce choices about framing, selection, and editing
in casebooks, treatises, court documents, and scholarship. Additionally, the sources containing information about minority
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groups, and thus about conquest, slavery, or race, are sometimes
different than those that contain the traditional records of reference for a field of study, producing the tendency to read segregated records as absence. Though ongoing and incomplete, this
scholarship accords with a well-developed and abundant historical scholarship that suggests there is good reason to presume
widespread erasure in historical accounts of American development, including American legal development. 67
In general, the scholarship addressing erasure is difficult to
characterize because it is ongoing and uneven with respect to conquest, slavery, and race more generally, as well as across legal
fields. Scholars of constitutional law may have most clearly articulated the problem of erasure after Professor Sanford Levinson
identified the absence of slavery in the field in the early 1990s, 68
triggering a shift in the canon. Following in this vein, Professor
Gregory Ablavsky showed recently in a series of articles that
omitting Natives has led to incomplete and inaccurate readings
of the Constitutional Convention, 69 the importance of the land

67 See notes 29–32 and accompanying text. See also generally Sarah Haley, No Mercy
Here: Gender, Punishment, and the Making of Jim Crow Modernity (UNC 2016) (accounting for the violent exploitation of Black women prisoners in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century Georgia); Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (Vintage
2015) (mapping the role of the slave trade in global industrial cotton production); Walter
Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Harvard
2013) (examining how slavery in the Mississippi Valley grew out of an imperial capitalist
project and produced unrealized imperial capitalist visions in the antebellum period);
Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (Zed
2d ed 2012) (discussing Indigenous perspectives on academic research that traditionally
made Indigenous people its object); Jean M. O’Brien, Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians Out of Existence in New England (Minn 2010) (chronicling how New England colonists
omitted tribal names and the existence of Native Americans when scripting their local
histories and renaming places, catalyzing the erasure of Natives from American history);
Saidiya Hartman, Venus in Two Acts, 26 Small Axe 1 (June 2008) (reflecting on the voices
left out of the archive of slavery through an analysis of the traces in the record of girls and
women on slave ships); Jennifer L. Morgan, Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender
in New World Slavery (Penn 2004); Robert A. Williams Jr, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford 1990) (discussing the evolution of
the “discourse of conquest” Spanish, English, and then early American jurists developed
regarding Native Americans, with particular focus on Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 US (8
Wheat) 543 (1823)).
68 See Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 Chi Kent L
Rev 1087, 1094 (1993) (highlighting the “necessity of teaching [slavery-related] materials
in law school as part of a standard . . . course on constitutional law”).
69 Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 Duke L J 999, 1038–50 (2014).
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question to the Founders, 70 and the rise of dual federalism. 71 Last
year, noting the broad success of Levinson’s intervention, Professor Maggie Blackhawk also argued for another paradigm shift in
the field with respect to colonization. 72 Blackhawk showed that
“[m]any areas of constitutional law were built and refined by interactions with Native Nations, Native peoples, and Native
lands.” 73 Observing that “a state of near erasure of Native Nations
and indigenous peoples” prevails in canonical constitutional
texts, she added that examining the history of US interaction
with Native Nations, beyond simple inclusion in the canon, “could
contribute to a fundamental rethinking of public law principles”—including different views of the treaty power, separation of
powers, the war powers, and powers inherent in sovereignty,
among others. 74
The work of uncovering counternarratives is relatively advanced in property law as well, where today, virtually every property law casebook in circulation acknowledges the foundational
status of Johnson v M’Intosh, 75 an 1823 Chief Justice John Marshall decision that identified conquest at the root of every chain
of title in the United States. 76 A few casebooks also address the
topic of slavery, and Professors Alfred L. Brophy, Alberto Lopez,
and Kali N. Murray have written a wonderful supplement elaborating on conquest, slavery, and other parts of the history of race
and property. 77 Nonetheless, there are many ways that these histories have become imprinted upon the field of law that few realize. For one anecdotal example, I recently stumbled across William M. Burwell’s White Acre vs. Black Acre: A Case at Law, 78 and
only thereby learned that “Blackacre” and “Whiteacre”—the legal
Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 Cal L Rev 631, 680 (2018).
See Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 Yale
L J 1792, 1824–27, 1855–61 (2019).
72 Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132
Harv L Rev 1787, 1804 n 74 (2019) (referencing Levinson’s “successful campaign to bring
slavery into the constitutional canon”).
73 Id at 1804.
74 Id at 1793–94, 1797, 1806–45.
75 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
76 Id at 588–89 (noting that “[t]he title to a vast portion of the lands we now hold”
was acquired “by the sword”).
77 See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Alberto Lopez, and Kali N. Murray, Integrating
Spaces: Property Law & Race (Wolters Kluwer 2011).
78 William M. Burwell, White Acre vs. Black Acre: A Case at Law; Reported by J. G.,
Esq., a Retired Barrister, of Lincolnshire, England (J.W. Randolph 1856).
70
71
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kadigans for fictional estates that appeared, though infrequently,
in English legal treatises and now pepper property-law hypotheticals and bar questions 79—constituted the title of a proslavery
novel published the same year as Dred Scott v Sandford 80 in response to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 81 In this
exceptionally dehumanizing work, the White Acre farm represents an incompetent northern farm and Black Acre represents a
southern plantation tended by loyal, hardworking slaves. 82 Likely
neither professors nor bar examiners who use these terms are
aware of this particular part of their history, nor can they make
informed choices about their continued use of them.
Recently, I examined approximately two hundred property
law casebooks for any mention of conquest, slavery, or race, 83 beginning with the first, published in 1888 by Professor John Chipman Gray. 84 It is worth noting that casebooks offer a useful index
of erasure, as they play a critical role in first-year legal education
and in maintaining a fairly stubborn canon. 85 Levinson’s comment about casebooks was widely applicable—substituting virtually any subject for “constitutional”—in that it remains
79 Edward Coke, First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of Englande, or, A Commentarie upon Littleton, Not the Name of a Lawyer Onely, But of the Law It Selfe 148 (2d ed
1629); Francis Buller, An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius 89 (5th
ed 1788). For an example of historical use of the Blackacre/Whiteacre terminology, see Sir
Thomas Edlyne Tomlins, The Law-Dictionary: Explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present
State of the British Law 441 (Payne 3d ed 1820). See also Jesse Dukeminier, James E.
Krier, Gregory S. Alexander, Michael H. Schill, and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Property 101
n 28 (Aspen 9th ed 2018) (discussing the historical origins of the terms and suggesting
they might indicate lands growing different crops or receiving different rents with no mention of the novel).
80 60 US (19 How) 393 (1856).
81 See generally Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom’s Cabin (John P. Jewett and Co
1852). Burwell’s book was part of a spate of publications known as “anti-Uncle Tom literature,” which even included children’s books. See Stephen Railton, Uncle Tom as Children’s Book, available at https://perma.cc/JP8G-4KQ2. See also Thomas F. Gossett, Uncle
Tom’s Cabin and American Culture 212–38 (SMU 1985).
82 See Burwell, White Acre vs. Black Acre 238, 242 (cited in note 78). The recent reprint I obtained, published by Scholar Select, reads, on the back: “This work has been
selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of
civilization as we know it.”
83 My team and I scanned the casebooks in their entirety for these terms and a cluster of related terms, as well as any case in which they appeared, to gather information
about the patterns I discuss below.
84 John Chipman Gray, Select Cases and Other Authorities on the Law of Property
(Sever 1888).
85 The relatively limited number of casebooks in print and in use at any given time and
the substantial uniformity of core curricula in legal education contribute to this stability.
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only slightly hyperbolic to say that any students whose
knowledge of American constitutional history will be derived
from their immersion in [such casebooks] will have only the
dimmest realization that the United States ever included a
system of chattel slavery or, just as importantly, that its implications pervaded every single aspect of constitutional law
(and constitutional interpretation). 86
I found that despite “the magnitude of the interest in litigation” 87 at the time Johnson was decided, its frequent appearance
in nineteenth-century treatises, 88 and its ubiquity now, not a single
property law casebook between 1888 and 1959 included a reprint
of the case. 89 Nor did any casebook describe legal approaches to
extinguishing Indian title, a centuries-long preoccupation of governments, nor how property law practices in the colonies or the
United States helped established Anglo-American claims to lands
held by Native Nations. Rather, casebooks avoid law from colonial
America altogether, despite key developments from that period in
land laws and practices that heavily informed the United States’
land system, such as the headright system, land grants and subsidies through which governments procured the labor of settlement, the survey system, preemption laws, and foreclosure. With
respect to the United States, the casebooks contain no mention of
the surveyor general, the Land Office, the Preemption Act or the
Homestead Act, which constitute such an important part of the
country’s lore. Instead, they incorporated nearly as many English
86 Levinson, 68 Chi Kent L Rev at 1089–90 (cited in note 68). Levinson also elaborated on the significance of the casebook: “[T]eachers construct their syllabi by reference
to what is easily available . . . [and] very few professors include in their syllabi material
that is not presented in one or another of the standard casebooks.” Id at 1088.
87 Johnson, 21 US (8 Wheat) at 604.
88 James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law 242–43 (O. Halsted 1826); Joseph
Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 2–8 at 4–7 (Little, Brown
2d ed 1851); Joseph Kinnicut Angell, A Treatise on the Right of Property in Tie Waters and
in the Soil and Shores Thereof 41 (Harrison Gray 1826); Timothy Walker, Introduction to
American Law: Designed as a First Book for Students 33, 147 (Little, Brown 10th ed 1895);
Joseph Kinnicut Angell and John Wilder May, A Treatise on the Limitations of Actions at
Law and Suits in Equity and Admiralty 416–17 (Little, Brown 1869).
89 There are two instances in which casebooks cited Johnson during this period. See,
William L. Burdick, Illustrative Cases on the Law of Real Property 37 (1914) (reproducing
a case involving the execution of a will, Barnett v Barnett, 117 Md 265 (1912), that briefly
cited Johnson for the proposition that title was absolute); John E. Cribbet, William F.
Fritz, and Corwin W. Johnson, Cases and Materials on Property 24 n 2 (Foundation 1960)
(citing Johnson in a footnote for its holding that some traditional rules of property were
inapplicable to the “savage[ ]” Natives).
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as US federal and state cases, and focused their discussions of
historical foundations on feudal English land practices. 90 As a result of these framing choices, 91 students whose understanding of
property law was based on any casebook in the field published
before 1974 would have had no notion that title to every parcel of
land within the territorial boundaries of the United States derives originally from Indian title or cession, or that laws played a
critical role in the dual processes of conquest and establishment
of the US land system.
The inclusion of the topic of slavery today remains highly uneven, and the record shows that this partial, persistent erasure is
the result of a history that has taken more than one turn. For the
first two decades after 1888, all property law casebooks that I examined included cases directly involving or citing cases involving
property in enslaved people to teach doctrines such as conversion,
statutes of limitation, replevin, trespass, bailment, ejection, and
more. 92 Most casebooks included several slavery cases until the
1930s, when the number of casebooks that dropped all cases involving property in enslaved people from their texts increased. 93
90 See, for example, Ralph W. Aigler, Allan F. Smith, and Sheldon Tefft, 1 Cases and
Materials on the Law of Property 382–91 (West 2d ed 1951).
91 Though preliminary because analysis is in progress, similar framing choices appear to have contributed to the absence of racial zoning cases prior to the 1950s. For example, Buchanan v Warley, 245 US 60 (1917), did not appear in any casebook until 1948,
in keeping with a general exclusion of public law in property law casebooks before then
(by contrast, English public law, such as rules concerning consequences of knighthood and
socage, frequently appeared). Cases addressing racially restrictive covenants were also
largely, though not entirely, absent from casebooks during the period in which such cases
proliferated, but casebooks began to incorporate Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948), relatively soon after the decision.
92 See, for example, William A. Finch, Selected Cases on the Law of Property in Land
570, 968–69 (Baker, Voorhis 2d ed 1912); John Chipman Gray, Select Cases and Other
Authorities on the Law of Property 33–38, 474–76, 611–13 (Kent 2d ed 1906); Grant Newell, Elements of the Law of Real Property with Leading and Illustrative Cases 344–48
(Flood 1902); William A. Finch, Selected Cases on the Law of Property in Land 218–30,
489–99, 551–555, 570, 968–69 (Baker, Voorhis 1898); Jasper C. Gates, Cases on the Law
of Real Property 57–64 (West 1898); Elmer E. Barrett, Cases on the Law of Real Property
38–43 (West 1898); Christopher G. Tiedeman, Selected Cases on Real Property 18–25
(Thomas Law Book 1897); W.S. Pattee, Illustrative Cases in Realty 606–13 (Johnson 1896)
Gray, Law of Property at 50–64, 271–80, 638–40 (cited in note 84).
93 Nonetheless, a few casebooks, including the three that Professor Harry A. Bigelow
co-edited with others (Professor Francis William Jacob, Judge J. Warren Madden, and
Professor William Leland Eckhardt in 1931, 1934 and 1942, respectively) and Professor
Ray Andrews Brown’s 1936 casebook, continued to include several cases involving property in enslaved people. See Harry A. Bigelow and Francis W. Jacob, Cases on the Law of
Personal Property 28–29 (West 1931); Harry A. Bigelow and Joseph Warren Madden,
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The last casebook to include slavery cases appeared in 1942, 94 after which I could find no casebooks that included any. Some included an edited version of a case that had cited slavery cases, but
with that portion edited out. 95 The history of slavery thereby became invisible in casebooks, so that for the following several decades, students would have had no inkling from the property law
casebooks that “the United States ever included a system of chattel slavery” 96 and that enslaved people for centuries constituted a
highly significant form of property in America. Before then, some
students might have had a sense of how common it had been to
claim property in human beings, but they would not have had
tools to understand the legal structure of the institution, its arc
or end, the racial social order it entrenched, or its relationship to
the growth and development of the land market in the colonies
and the United States.
However, as I teach my own students, relatively newly acquired land and enslaved people together constituted the vast majority of all property held by colonists on the eve of the Revolution; 97 enslaved labor fueled territorial expansion, while
territorial expansion drove the growth of the slave trade; and enslaved labor presents the most profound institutional contradiction to the theory that labor creates property entitlements 98—a
Introduction to the Law of Real Property 489, 671 (West 2d ed 1934); Harry A. Bigelow and
Willard Leland Eckhardt, Cases and Other Materials on the Law of Personal Property 35,
342 (West 3d ed 1942); Ray Andrews Brown, 1 Treatise on the Law of Personal Property
334 (Callaghan and Co 1936).
94 See Bigelow and Eckhardt, Cases and Other Materials on the Law of Personal
Property 35, 342 (cited in note 93).
95 The case was Chapin v Freeland, 8 NE 128 (Mass 1886). For this case’s discussion
of cases involving property in enslaved people, see id at 132. See also Cribbet, Cases and
Materials on Property 59–61 (cited in note 89).
96 Levinson, 68 Chi Kent L Rev at 1089 (cited in note 68).
97 Land and enslaved persons collectively constituted about 75 percent of all property
across the thirteen colonies: roughly 72 percent in New England, 66 percent in the “Middle
Colonies,” and 80 percent in the South. See Alice Hanson Jones, Wealth of a Nation to Be:
The American Colonies on the Eve of Revolution 97 tbl 4.3 (Columbia 1980). See also id at
95–100 (generally discussing physical wealth in the colonies).
98 Virtually all property law casebooks teach this theory as a justification for property rights, using the case International News Service v Associated Press, 248 US 215
(1918). Yet the labor theory of value played a crucial role in justifying colonists’ appropriation of lands held by Native Nations for centuries, in writings from Richard Hakluyt to
Samuel Purchas to, most famously, John Locke. See Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost
their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier 31, 46–48 (Belknap 2005); Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought at 246–49 (cited in note 67); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration 111–21 (Yale 2003) (I. Shapiro,
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ubiquitous part of property law syllabi—in American history. The
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the climate created by the
Black Power movement, the American Indian Movement (AIM),
and others, seem to have ushered in a significant shift with respect to casebook authors’ willingness to confront the ways that
race historically shaped property and property law in America. 99
In 1974, Professor Charles Donahue and his co-authors incorporated the text of Johnson into a casebook for the first time, 100 and
property law casebooks increasingly began to incorporate Johnson thereafter. 101 In 1978, Professor Richard Chused published an
extraordinary casebook that included lengthy sections on Johnson, conquest, federal Indian law, slavery, racial and gender discrimination in housing, as well as women’s property rights. 102 And
in the 1990s, Professor Joseph Singer’s integration of elements of
the histories of conquest and slavery with the doctrines of the traditional property law curriculum greatly helped to normalize acknowledgment of the centrality of these histories to the field. 103
Though these casebook authors did not explicitly address the
problem of erasure, they offered material to counter it, and
thereby reset the margins of the field.

ed) (originally published 1689); Christopher Tomlins, The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement: English Intrusions on the American Mainland in
the Seventeenth Century, 26 L & Soc Inquiry 315, 364 n 67 (2001).
99 Prior to that, casebooks began to include public law in the 1950s in another notable
shift. Authors began to cut material on the English feudal land system and to incorporate
more material on the public records and the US land system. However, in contrast to the
English historical framing they often nevertheless retained, their discussions of the public
land system were completely ahistorical.
100 Charles Donahue Jr, Thomas E. Kauper, and Peter W. Martin, Cases and Materials on Property: An Introduction to the Concept and the Institution 235–43 (West 1974).
101 See, for example, Charles Monroe Haar and Lance Liebman, Property and Law 3–
13 (Little, Brown 1977); Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, Property 113–14 (Little,
Brown 1st ed 1981).
102 See Richard H. Chused, A Modern Approach to Property: Cases, Notes, Materials
83–98 (West 1978) (referencing and discussing Johnson in text and accompanying notes);
id at 98–126 (discussing cases regarding the removal of the Cherokees); id at 644–47 (discussing slavery, with particular focus on Dred Scott); id at 648–69 (discussing racial discrimination in housing, with particular focus on Clark v Universal Builders, Inc, 501 F2d
324 (7th Cir 1974), a 1974 Seventh Circuit case addressing claims of racially-based housing discrimination in Chicago); id at 294–336 (discussing marital estates, with focus on
the historical evolution of women’s property rights).
103 See Joseph William Singer, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices 23–42
(Aspen 2d ed 1997) (discussing conquest); id at 1326–42 (discussing slavery).
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Nonetheless, some of the most widely adopted casebooks continue to eschew any mention of slavery. 104 Further, while canonicity
matters greatly (since “very few professors include in their syllabi
material that is not presented in one or another of the standard
casebooks” 105), the mere availability of materials does not ensure
that people will teach those topics. Teachers are likely to default
to subjects more familiar and comfortable to them, and conquest
and slavery are unlikely to be familiar or comfortable subjects for
any who have not made them a special area of research. Though
Johnson is now ubiquitous, casebook authors’ notes for the case
vary widely, 106 addressing principles such as first-in-time, 107 certainty, 108 and only occasionally, the crucial issue that the case actually settled—chain of title. 109 Often, the explanations of the discovery doctrine are limited and sometimes inaccurate, 110 and
Chief Justice Marshall’s admittedly winding discussion of how
European and colonial entities applied the discovery doctrine to
their conquests almost never appears. 111 The result is more confusion than clarity about the history of conquest. Just as Johnson
104 The current, 2018 edition of the leading casebook by Dukeminier, et al, mentions
slavery twice: first, in a footnote about Chief Justice John Holt, an English judge who “laid
down the rule that the status of slavery could not exist in England; as soon as a slave
breathed the air of England he was free” (this misleading account of slavery in England
cites Smith v Brown & Cooper, 2 Salk 666, 90 Eng Rep 1172 (1703)). See Dukeminier, et
al, Property 36 n 17 (cited in note 79). Then, as a passing addendum to Locke’s labor theory
introducing cases about property in one’s bodily cells (“every man has a property in his
own person”): “Slavery, obviously, was in opposition to that proposition, but slavery has
been abolished. So, can we now say, without qualification, that you have property in yourself?” Id at 167.
105 Levinson, 68 Chi Kent L Rev at 1088–90 (cited in note 68).
106 See Dukeminier, et al, Property at 10–19 (cited in note 79).
107 See, for example, Dukeminier, et al, Property at 12–15 (cited in note 79).
108 See, for example, Jerry L. Anderson and Daniel B. Bogart, Property Law: Practice,
Problems, and Perspectives 17–27 (Wolters Kluwer 2015).
109 See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and
Policies 119–20 (Foundation 2d ed 2012); John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property
Law 5 (Carolina 4th ed 2017).
110 Professors Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith accurately describe the operative principle of the discovery doctrine as a first-in-time right to possess. But Merrill and
Smith, Professor John G. Sprankling, and Professors Jerry L. Anderson and Daniel B.
Bogart all omit a basic explanation of what the discovery doctrine was, which Chief Justice
Marshall himself explains quite clearly. See Merrill and Smith, Property: Principles and
Policies at 90, 97–101 (cited in note 109); Sprankling, Understanding Property Law at 35–
36 (cited in note 109); Jerry L. Anderson and Daniel B. Bogart, Property Law: Practice,
Problems, and Perspectives at 25–27 (Wolters Kluwer 2019). But see Dukeminier, et al,
Property 11–12 (cited in note 79) (providing such an explanation).
111 For one exception, see Dukeminier, et al., Property at 4–6 (cited in note 79).
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is a difficult case to teach in the absence of expertise or adequate
teaching aids, property law professors that do address slavery
usually excerpt Dred Scott, whose convoluted discussion focuses
on constitutional law questions of federalism and citizenship that
are challenging and involve more complex legal questions than
those typically presented during the first year. The difficulty of
clearly connecting the case to property law—beyond the point
that to treat human beings as property crosses moral boundaries
that should also be legal boundaries—further deters many from
teaching this history at all. Moreover, though important, both
Johnson and Dred Scott are monumental Supreme Court cases
unrepresentative of property cases in general, or, more specifically, the extensive body of colonial, state, and US cases involving
property law questions and Indian title or property in slaves.
Many property law professors, in keeping with firmly established
tradition and likely their own legal education, are likely not to
prioritize teaching these histories, even if some material about
them is available, and even if they are open to unconventional
approaches to the subject.
A key conundrum of attempting to teach into the space left
by an erasure is that the information that demonstrates the connection between histories of conquest and slavery and any given
area of law is largely not available, even to scholars in the field,
without taking erasure itself as an object of study. We are newly
aware, for example, of the breathtaking extent to which “judges
and litigants [ ] continue to treat slave cases as good law” because
of Professor Justin Simard’s painstaking research, now catalogued in a public database, containing over three hundred disputes in which contemporary judges cited slavery cases. 112 Simard
found that approximately 80 percent of cases that cited slavery in
the last thirty-five years—including in decisions from courts in a
majority of states, most federal courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court—did not acknowledge the content of slavery in the
case. 113 If he had not tracked, compiled, and studied the original
texts of these cases, it would be impossible to realize when a single case from a string cite or block quotation represents the living
legacy of slavery, to understand the cumulative extent of this

112 See Justin Simard, Citing Slavery, 72 Stan L Rev 79, 94, 97 (2020). For the database, see Justin Simard, Citing Slavery (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5NYY-B5GB.
113 Simard, 72 Stan L Rev at 81–82, 97–98 (cited in note 112).
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legacy, or to ask questions about its effects. Moreover, the collection of this erasure permits Simard to observe that the law of slavery penetrated and pervaded the fields not only of property, but
also “contracts, [ ] civil procedure, criminal procedure, statutory
interpretation, torts, and many other fields.” 114 Scholars have traditionally conceived of the “law of slavery” as consisting of laws
governing the status and disability of enslaved persons, their
punishment, and their capture 115—a now obsolete body of law.
However, the fundamental legal subjects from which that body
was distinguished in fact regulated commerce in slaves, in ways
that may well have influenced their development. As Simard
writes, slavery cases were “part of the foundation of American jurisprudence,” 116 and judges facilitated this all-important market
through common law cases concerning disputes about “negligent
damage to property, adverse possession, double jeopardy, the conduct of executors, contract interpretation, jury discretion in forfeiture cases, dram-shop liability, marriage, estoppel, capacity,
examination of witnesses, fraudulent conveyance, statutory interpretation, and many other doctrines.” 117
Despite the fact that, as Simard’s research affirms, virtually
every area of law constituted a part of the law of slavery 118 (not to
mention conquest 119), erasures of these histories have received
even less attention than most of the other basic subjects of the
law school curriculum. The citational mechanics of how omissions
perpetuate omissions accord, and sometimes converge, with the
ways that legal citational practice hides historical context. The
study of such erasures suggests that the various processes that
produce it include, inter alia, choices of frameworks, selection,
and editing. From one edition of a casebook or treatise to the next,
we see selection and editing choices in omissions of cases involving Native people, slaves, free Black people, or other nonwhites,
Id at 81.
See id at 86. See also generally Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law,
1619–1860 (UNC 1996).
116 Simard, 72 Stan L Rev at 85 (cited in note 112).
117 Id at 94–95.
118 See id.
119 See Blackhawk, 132 Harv L Rev at 1800 (noting that “interactions between the
national government and Native Nations shaped the warp and woof of United States constitutional law from the Founding”) (cited in note 72); Angela R. Riley, Native Nations and
the Constitution: An Inquiry into “Extra-Constitutionality”, 130 Harv L Rev F 173, 173
(2017) (acknowledging that “virtually every area of law in the American canon has an
‘Indian law’ component”).
114
115
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or portions of cases mentioning them, or even, in some instances,
specific words identifying nonwhites in the text of cases. With respect to race, for example, Professor Kevin Johnson noted that between the seventh and eighth editions of their civil procedure casebook, one set of authors edited language out of a 1961 “gardenvariety automobile accident case” from the Mississippi Supreme
Court “not[ing] that a witness (Hal Buckley) was ‘a Negro man.’” 120
Professor Dylan Penningroth has conducted extensive primary research for an article-in-progress to identify similar examples of
erasures in influential casebooks, treatises, and articles. 121
In addition to citational practices, erasure in legal texts also
results from the particularity of sources that contain records pertaining to conquest, slavery, and race. The long history of segregation is reflected in the fact that the sources of records concerning nonwhites frequently cannot be found in precisely the same
places that records concerning whites are kept, even with respect
to parties’ involvement in the same kind of transaction, doctrine,
or practice. 122 Cases involving litigants of color, for example,
might not reach appellate courts, leading scholars examining records from higher courts to miss their role in shaping legal practices and norms. 123 My research on the history of mortgage foreclosure in colonial America describes transactions for land
between Native people and colonists that are memorialized in
public deed records and private account books, 124 but did not appear in the colonial legislation that other scholars have

120 Kevin R. Johnson, Integrating Racial Justice Into the Civil Procedure Survey
Course, 54 J Legal Educ 242, 259 (2004), citing John J. Cound, Jack H. Friedenthal, Arthur R. Miller, and John E. Sexton, Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials 1011 (St Paul
7th ed 1997), and John J. Cound, Jack H. Friedenthal, Arthur R. Miller, and John E. Sexton, Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials 1049 (St Paul 8th ed 2001).
121 See Dylan Penningroth, Race and Contract Law *46 n 210 (unpublished manuscript, 2020) (on file with author).
122 Another major example is treaties, which came to form a distinct collection of records after the federal government claimed prerogative to transact with tribes for land under the Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1 Stat 137 (1790), and contracts for land no longer
belonged to the same genre as other kinds of contracts, as previously. Similarly, petitions
for “Indian depredations,” or indemnity claims for property losses incurred by settlers on
the frontier form their own discrete record set at the National Archive, distinct from other
kinds of petitions. See National Archives, Guide to Senate Records: Chapter 12 Indian
Depredations 1893–1921 (Aug 15, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/CFV9-US95.
123 See generally, for example, Penningroth, Race and Contract Law (cited in
note 117).
124 See generally Park, 41 L & Soc Inquiry 1006 (cited in note 24).
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examined. 125 The difficulty of anticipating the variety of relevant
sources to the history, in other words, has made it easy to overlook
the earliest history of foreclosure in America. 126
The work that has engaged the legal academy in the task of
investigating erasure suggests that it is reasonable to adopt a presumption of erasure, or at least, raises the question of what evidence would justify one. Acknowledging these histories and their
erasure, as Purdy does, is a necessary first step; however, tracking erasures by considering these various possibilities and
(re)constructing the history of a legal doctrine or practice requires
significant labor. Scholars looking only at legislation but not
county deed records, at records from higher courts but not lower
ones, or even lower court decisions but not county records, might
perceive absence of nonwhites in a field where they were highly
active. The difficulty of knowing whether information is missing
from a given record, what the significance of that information is,
and whether other pertinent archives exist is formidable. Nevertheless, work inside and outside the legal academy further suggests that the regulation of the trade in enslaved persons was a
massive part of regulating market activity for courts; 127 that conquest and creating a system of property law in America were part
of the same endeavor; that everyday business could not proceed
without transacting with racial minorities, leading to claims that
would have come before courts. It appears from this work that
frequently, by failing to consider these histories, we have formed
conclusions and presumptions about law on the basis of incomplete information, both with respect to individual cases and structural questions concerning the development of key doctrines and
practices. The pervasiveness of patterns of erasure across fields—
together with the challenges of identifying and understanding
erasures—further advise that the work on erasure and these histories’ role in shaping American law likely represents merely a
floor of significance.

125 See generally, for example, Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 Harv L Rev 385 (2006) (analyzing colonial laws relating to the rights of holders of real property against creditors).
126 Difficulty locating the sources that contain relevant information, especially pertaining to earlier historical periods, also contributes to the challenges of recovering an understanding of how those histories impacted a single case, an entire doctrine, or practice.
127 See, for example, Simard, 72 Stan L Rev at 90–94 (cited in note 112).
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II. CONSEQUENCES OF ERASURE
Recognizing erasure is a necessary first step for understanding how histories of conquest, slavery, and race shaped American
legal institutions. However, erasure presents problems that are
not solely a matter of correcting the historical record, or of factual
inaccuracy. The legacies of erasure are also conceptual and social,
affecting perspective, representation, inequality, and the very
possibility of communicating effectively across differences. While
the relationship between perspective and representation may already appear intuitive—for example, it is a familiar idea that including (and representing) different groups in institutions brings
diverse perspectives—this Part examines the ways that each concept constitutes a consequence of erasure and requires engaging
an additional body of literature.
Part II.A addresses the necessity of looking at historical accounts of legal doctrines or practices that do not discuss conquest,
slavery, or race, in order to determine how much the history influenced the theory. Many broadly accepted ideas, norms, and ideals about the US legal system derive from filtered narratives. As
Professor Purdy sensitively shows, one’s acceptance of specific
histories, and not others, shapes one’s perspectives and one’s attachment to such ideas, norms, and ideals.
Part II.B discusses how literature from federal Indian law,
legal history, and critical race studies helps furnish some of the
information that is absent from other literatures. By describing
how the laws during conquest, slavery, and their aftermath produced persistent problems of representation of nonwhites—
through formal exclusion, predatory inclusion, and cultivation of
harmful racial stereotypes—this literature also highlights the
value of representation: other perspectives on, contributions to,
and conceptions of the law whose absences have both distorted
our understandings of how we arrived at our present predicaments and challenged our ability to communicate about our collective history.
A. The Challenge of Perspective
Throughout his book, on the wide terrain for “everyone” that
Purdy maps, he routinely marks the problem of different
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perspectives. 128 The thread of the book is his reference to “the
world we have made,” but of course, he acknowledges, “it isn’t
simply ‘we’—it’s the effects some of us are having on the planet,
unequally visited on others, through the medium of the world itself, its floods and droughts and killing heat.” 129 Mentioning the
deportation of Samuel Oliver-Bruno from Durham, where Purdy
himself lived free from this threat, he comments, “[s]ome have
more to fear than others.” 130 Similarly, he describes “what the
United States has often promised and sometimes delivered to its
insiders, the ones who have been counted as full members in the
community” 131—“the promise that leaders and prophets have
made again and again, at least to those insiders who have counted
as ‘real Americans’” 132—to implicitly underscore the exclusion of
many outsiders. Equality, dignity, and safety are promises he
wants for everyone, but because of the nation’s foundational history, land’s “ownership means power for some over others”; 133
“[t]he land is sorted into those who own the places where they
live, those who own another’s place[,] . . . and those who work
there on the sufferance of at-will hiring and firing.” 134 For Purdy,
perspective comes out of the past and will shape the future: History “confirms that what Americans inherit in common is terribly
unequal and compromised.” 135 And without a new commons, he
warns, “those of us who enjoy some freedom and small power in
this world will have to choose between cynically hoarding a
chance at half decent survival for our own families and closest
allies or nihilistically watching crises crash at the walls of this
unequal world.” 136
Indeed, Purdy places a chapter on appreciating the total, embodied, and affective character of perspective at the very center of
his book. 137 In “Losing a Country,” he writes about his response to
President Donald Trump’s election, confessing that “nothing has
128 See, for example, Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 1–2 (cited in note 1) (contrasting two different viewpoints on “the nature of our civic enmity”).
129 Id at 21.
130 Id at viii.
131 Id at xii.
132 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xiii (cited in note 1).
133 Id at x.
134 Id.
135 Id at xx.
136 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xxiii (cited in note 1).
137 See id at 55–75.
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hit me quite like 2016.” 138 He locates the root of his shock in having felt the boundaries of his own perspective: “Shaken,” he wondered, “What else have I failed to understand about this place?” 139
Reeling, he finds a point of identification and guidance in an 1854
essay by Thoreau called “Slavery in Massachusetts,” and, in particular, Thoreau’s “disorientation” and visceral sense that his
world was falling apart after Massachusetts’s return of Anthony
Burns to a Virginia slaveholder 140 in compliance with the Fugitive
Slave Act. 141 Indeed, his chapter takes its title from Thoreau, who
wrote, “I have lived for the last month . . . with the sense of having
suffered a vast and indefinite loss. I did not know at first what
ailed me. At last it occurred to me that what I had lost was a
country.” 142 Purdy, like Thoreau, details the emotional upheaval
that comes with feeling one’s perspective shift: “Losing a country,”
he realizes, means “losing your way of living with it. The country
has not receded far away, but grown overwhelmingly close. It occupies your head in the most disruptive and intolerable ways.” 143
Further, he continues,
A country lost in this fashion may never have been more than
a pleasing illusion, a gauze of selective ignorance or indifference. “Losing a country” may be a way of describing coming
to see it more clearly. . . . Thoreau is complaining about,
among other things, losing the privilege of ignoring slavery
much of the time while also disapproving of it. 144
Somewhat fleetingly, Purdy acknowledges other perspectives and
the pattern of erasure that left Anthony Burns’s thoughts out of
the court record (and Thoreau’s musings). 145 He imagines Burns
“knew a great deal about the United States, and it seems likely
that in his mind he had no country to lose.” 146 However, he admits,
“I am much more Thoreau than Burns,” 147 acknowledging that “to
Id at 56.
Id at 57.
140 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 57–59 (cited in note 1).
141 9 Stat 462 (1850), repealed by An Act to Repeal the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and
All Acts and Parts of Acts for the Rendition of Fugitive Slaves, 13 Stat 200 (1864).
142 Id at 57 (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original), quoting Henry David
Thoreau, Slavery in Massachusetts (1854).
143 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 59–60 (cited in note 1).
144 Id.
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 61 (cited in note 1).
138
139
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be able to make this complaint publicly, to report on your new and
unsettling experience of citizenship, is also a part of privilege.” 148
By speaking from his own standpoint, Purdy grounds us in
the question of perspective, as he reports: “This is a deliberately
personal way of talking about paths out of, or through, the dark
wood where some of us woke up on November 9, 2016, and have
been wandering since.” 149 The election outcome that disturbed his
consciousness and sent him reeling took Purdy to the history of
slavery, and Thoreau’s similarly shattered faith. Through that
identification, Purdy recognizes that neither Massachusetts’s enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act nor Trump’s election would
necessarily have caught someone else so off guard. As he understands, someone enslaved, like Burns, would have comprehended
the risks of fugitivity under the country’s laws; someone who regularly bore the brunt of white supremacy in the United States
might have better anticipated the powerful appeal of the racism
that brought Trump to power. 150 Throughout this essay, Purdy
registers his own sense of shock at the difference between his own
and another’s perspective—between their experiences, sensibilities, worldviews, attachments, and expectations. The limit of his
own consciousness that so hurt him appears to be a recognition
that the difference between him and another was that other’s experience of unequally distributed violence—a perspective erased
within his own experience—which might have led the other to
have expected the outcome of the election.
Purdy’s lengthy set of reflections here indexes how viscerally
painful it is to release attachments to concepts and understandings of the world that arose—in ways he did not fully understand
until the contradictions broke—from the erasure of others’
worldviews. The difficulty of reassessing foundational assumptions and wrestling with the significance of erasure occurs across
varieties of experiences, domains of practice, and dissemination
of scholarship, including legal scholarship. In law, moreover, the
challenge of rethinking meets a particularly obdurate set of

148 Id at 60. Burns did, however, wage an extremely active public campaign against
slavery after the experience Thoreau (and Purdy) describe. See generally Gordon S.
Barker, Anthony Burns and the North-South Dialogue on Slavery, Liberty, Race, and the
American Revolution (unpublished PhD dissertation, The College of William & Mary,
2009), archived at https://perma.cc/5EPC-2RGF.
149 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 68–69 (cited in note 1).
150 See id at 60.
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foundational assumptions, and many of these assumptions are
formulated abstractly rather than as a matter of historical commitment or formation. Concepts of law, like the ideals and norms
associated with them, are not always understood as products of
historical formation; the abstract terms used to summarize these
basic subjects often seem to float independently above our shifting sense of the nation’s historical arc.
An outcome that did not accord with how Purdy understood
his world forced him to search for new stories or facts that could
explain it, leading him to newly conceptualize the world and his
position in it. Similarly, new insights into the historical development of legal fields can affect parts of the conceptual universe
that legal scholars have long taken for granted, and in general,
offer evidence germane to questions about the development of different areas of law. I have argued, for example, that the system
of Indian depredation claims—an independent archive of petitions turned claims against the government to indemnify losses
incurred by settlers on the frontier—constitutes a part of the history of federal torts, and shed light on the way the federal government utilized the tort structure to provide a system of social insurance that supported westward expansion. 151 Similarly to the
way Morton Horwitz theorized courts’ shift from strict liability to
negligence in torts cases to create a subsidy for employers at a
time when increasing numbers of people were suffering from
workplace injuries, 152 the history of Indian depredation claims
suggests that the government created a subsidy for itself by delaying compensation that it had guaranteed to individuals to induce them to settle on the frontier and thereby further its goals
of conquest. 153
Methodologically, attempting to understand the significance
of erasure in specific fields of law requires comprehensively engaging scholarship about a legal doctrine or practice generated
151 See Park, 8 Hist of the Present at 60–64 (cited in note 30). The system of Indian
depredation claims predates even the pension program for Civil War veterans that is usually said to be the earliest example of a major government experiment in social insurance.
See, for example, Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and
the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 Loyola LA L Rev 1063,
1096–1102 (1997) (discussing the Civil War pension system and calling it “the United
States’ first mass-scale federal social welfare program”).
152 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 54–63, 123–36 (Oxford 1992).
153 See Park, 8 Hist of the Present at 68–73 (cited in note 30).
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from a standpoint without access to buried material or a presumption of erasure. That literature may contain clues about the
configuration of the erasure so that this study is correlated with
building a positive account using new material from the archive.
However, many widely established theories about legal doctrines
that appear in works that do not themselves engage with history
were nevertheless developed from interpretations of historical accounts. It is therefore also critical to examine the general literature in order to understand whether its conceptual conclusions
rely on accounts of the historical development of the legal doctrine
or practice. If they do, one must ask how they do, and whether a
different historical account accords with, adds to, contradicts,
subtends, or otherwise modifies the conceptual frameworks that
have been based on narratives from which key histories have been
effaced.
B. The Challenge of Representation
The connection between the pattern of omitting histories of
conquest, slavery, and race from legal texts and the persistent
legacies of the formal exclusions that were a part of those histories may already seem clear. However, there are many different
problems of representation that stem from erasure—minorities’
contributions have been erased from historical records, but they
have also historically experienced actual exclusion from institutions. Both make members of minority groups and the particular
obstacles they face invisible, but the tendency to conflate discursive and material exclusions only exacerbates the erasure of their
contributions—how they acted to shape law and legal practice, in
addition to experiencing hardship because of it. This Section describes why it is essential to synthesize the kind of primary source
research discussed in Part I, with the literature premised on erasure discussed in Part II.A, and the rich existent literature in federal Indian law, legal history, and critical race studies that has
focused on the experiences of minority groups and the legal challenges they have faced. The complementary and in some ways derivative project of examining the impact of these histories on the
law highlights again the importance of representation put forward by this literature long ago: bringing omitted voices into conversations about institutions in which they were always involved,
in order to understand more about those institutions, their human and other effects, and our collective world.
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The literature on the ways laws have affected nonwhite
groups because of conquest and slavery has been extensively established by scholars of Native American history, federal Indian
law, African American history, and legal history. 154 That work addresses the segregated legal forms that applied specifically to
nonwhites, including laws of Indian Affairs, later federal Indian
law, as well as many iterations of Black Codes and the legal regime of Jim Crow. 155 In somewhat complicated ways, nonwhite
groups have also long had restricted and limited access to the legal venues and processes that white people used, though they
were long excluded from lawmaking, judgment, and other processes of institutional decisionmaking. 156 Interracial transactions
and commerce were ordinary, everyday, and indeed indispensable. Without it, for example, colonists could not have come into
possession of most of the territory in their jurisdictions, which
they boasted of acquiring by purchase; and many early techniques
of commercial predation likely developed through such commerce. 157 However, legal texts also helped cultivate racial stereotypes that justified and facilitated conquest, slavery, and a range
of forms of racial exclusion and predatory inclusion that constituted a part of these processes and exceeded them. A voluminous
literature has amply described and documented how nonwhites
served as malleable and peripheral figures in legal discourse
154 See generally, for example, Lisa Brooks, Our Beloved Kin (Yale 2018); Yasuhide
Kawashima, Puritan Justice and the Indian: White Man’s Law in Massachusetts, 1630–
1763 (Wesleyan 1986); David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (Texas 1997); A. Leon Higginbotham Jr, In the Matter
of Color: Race and the American Legal Process. The Colonial Period (Oxford 1978); Thomas
D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619–1820 (North Carolina 1996).
155 See generally, for example, Walter R. Echo-Hawk, In the Courts of the Conqueror:
The 10 Worst Indian Law Cases Ever Decided (Fulcrum 2010) (describing the legal miscarriages of justice Natives have suffered in US courts); Vanessa Holloway, Black Rights
in the Reconstruction Era (Hamilton 2018) (explaining the limitations on African Americans’ access to justice during the Reconstruction era).
156 See generally, for example, Vine Deloria Jr and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice (Texas 1983); Natalie J. Ring and Amy Louise Wood, eds, Crime
and Punishment in the Jim Crow South (Illinois 2019). But see Melissa Milewski, From
Slave to Litigant: African Americans in Court in the Postwar South, 1865-1920, 30 L &
Hist Rev 723, 724 (2012), But see generally Lyle Koehler, Red-White Power Relations and
Justice in the Courts of Seventeenth-Century New England, 3 Am Indian Culture & Rsrch
J 1 (1979).
157 See generally Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power
on the Frontier (Belknap 2005) (discussing US acquisition of Natives’ territory as a result
of military conquest, consensual sales, and legal frameworks which ultimately privileged
white ownership and definitions of property). See also note 122.
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during colonization and slavery. 158 Native and Black people received whatever attributes helped to justify the violence colonists
enacted upon them in order to extract value, in land or labor, from
them: they became prehistoric, savage, criminal, or inhuman
beasts, as the theory required. 159 These stereotypes erased or minimized the humanity of nonwhite groups and profoundly shaped
social relations. Consequently, colonial and US literature grew
less inclined over time to recognize the extent to which nonwhite
groups participated in the development of the colonies, the country, and the laws. Indeed, nonwhite groups helped colonial communities survive by economically and politically transacting with
white people, in addition to asserting their own humanity, freedom and habeas suits and political independence through negotiations, treaties, and wars. 160
The persistence of ideas about nonwhite groups that erase
their agency—historically and in the present—runs parallel to
the complicity of legal institutions in racializing, subordinating,
and extracting wealth from legal texts. Scholars of Native American history, federal Indian law, and the history of enslaved and
freedpeople, both in and outside of the legal academy, have indeed
addressed both sides of this problem—the resilience and development of these groups as well as the specific laws and institutions
that challenged their survival. In so doing, this literature has
158 The literature is too voluminous to attempt to summarize, but no one has more
thoroughly accounted for the ways that Spanish, English, and Anglo-American legal discourses fashioned the idea of “the Indian” as a foil for theories of conquest espoused by
European sovereigns during the Age of Discovery than Robert A. Williams Jr in The American Indian in Western Legal Thought. See generally Robert A. Williams Jr, The American
Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford 1990). A. Leon Higginbotham Jr’s In the Matter of Color is also exemplary. See generally Higginbotham Jr,
In the Matter of Color (cited in note 154). For other classic titles exploring this issue in the
colonial period, see generally Theodore W. Allen, The Invention of the White Race: Racial
Oppression and Social Control (Verso 1994); Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Towards the Negro, 1550–1812 (W.W. Norton 1977).
159 See, for example, Johnson, 21 US (8 Wheat) at 590 (“[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence
was drawn chiefly from the forest.”).
160 See, for example, Commonwealth v Aves, 35 Mass (18 Pick) 193 (1836) (adjudicating a habeas corpus suit brought by an enslaved person). See also John William Tebbel
and Keith Warren Jennison, The American Indian Wars 1–146 (Harper 1960) (chronicling
the military conquest of the United States in the colonial American Indian wars). See also
generally Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly (California 1994) (discussing the hundreds of treaties that were ratified between the
United States and Native Nations from 1778 and 1868 and their unique situation in American history).
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established a foundation for understanding the laws that structured conquest, slavery, and their aftermath, furnishing the basic
tools necessary for inquiring about the impact of the histories of
colonization and slavery. Thus, though those fields have been
held as separate and nonessential to the study of the fundamental
law subjects discussed above, 161 scholarship that asks how the
histories of subordination and extraction shaped the basic components of our legal system is properly understood as an outgrowth
of the literature that has placed its emphasis and centered its
frames on marginalized groups. 162
The project of exploring the impact of these histories on the
shape of the law therefore illuminates the inherent relationship
between fields that have long been viewed as marginal and elective versus the core of the study of US law. Both work that focuses
on affected groups and that which focuses on accounts of the law
respond to and attempt to remediate historical patterns of erasure. The social as well as political and economic legacies of formal
exclusion have meant that integration and representation of minority groups in legal fields has increased slowly over time, but
also that social barriers have outlived the barriers of formal legal
exclusion. 163 Early, prescient critiques that drew attention to the
social consequences of erasure more than three decades ago also
focused on the ways in which legal education and other factors
marginalized the experiences and perspectives of women and minority students. 164 Even without the information surfacing now
161 It is possible that this distinction came about in part because of—and may have
found some justification in—the fact that sometimes material concerning nonwhites
within a particular field of law or practice was located in different sources than material
concerning transactions between white people. See Part I.B.
162 Though closely allied, these types of projects have distinguishable foci and aims as
a result of their different frames. Work that explores the different challenges groups faced
during colonization, slavery, and their aftermath more directly illuminates the reasoning
and support for reparations and affirmative action policies, for example. Work that focuses
on the ramifications of these histories on the law itself more directly raises questions of structural change and systemic (re)design. These distinctions, however, are somewhat artificial
and reflect differences in degrees of pragmatism more than substantive commitment.
163 For an example of a recent work describing this dynamic in the context of housing,
see Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry
Undermined Black Homeownership 18–19 (UNC 2019) (describing the discriminatory nature of the Federal Housing Administration program that extended mortgages to communities of color after decades of redlining and showing how discrimination can occur through
predatory inclusion as well as formal exclusion).
164 See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 11 Natl Black L J 1, 9–10 (1988); Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models,
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about the extent and mechanisms of erasure of race and histories
of subordination in the main first-year subjects, Professors Kimberlé Crenshaw and Lani Guinier both described the alienation
students felt in classrooms where the issues that they understood
best and that most affected them did not appear in the curriculum. 165 Crenshaw commented that “[t]he racial dimensions of traditional law school subject areas are seldom discussed. On the few
occasions when racial dimensions are considered the issues raised
are either summarily addressed or mentioned only in passing.” 166
Guinier, speaking perhaps to her own sense of isolation on a
faculty at the time, likewise spoke of the need for professors who
could “acknowledge[ ] where appropriate the relevance of race or
gender.” 167 Both Guinier and Crenshaw observed the harmful effects of erasure on students who were expected to model a view of
“perspectivelessness” 168 in the classroom, “ignorant to differences
of culture, gender and race.” 169 As work on erasure and representation continues to grow, so do the dimensions of this critique: this
year, Professor Blackhawk renewed Guinier and Crenshaw’s observations about the failure of the legal academy to confront its
own erasures in a personal essay about confronting the invisibility of Native Nations and her experience as a Native person at
Stanford Law School in the late 2000s. 170 “One way that Native
people combat the active erasure of Indian Country,” Blackhawk
writes of the burden that individuals who experience erasure
carry, “is to self-identify. In doing so, we put our bodies and our
reputations between the force of erasure and the furtherance of
the American colonial project.” 171
Of course, the way that students of color and women have felt
their own experiences and perspectives rendered invisible and
delegitimized through erasure in the classroom—erasure of their
6 Berkeley Women’s L J 93, 93–97 (1990). See also Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race
from Legal Education, 28 U Mich J L Ref 51, 67–80 (1994) (discussing the “color-blind”
orientation of legal education and the pernicious effects that this orientation can have on
Black students).
165 See Crenshaw, 11 Natl Black L J at 9–10 (cited in note 164); Guinier, 6 Berkeley
Women’s L J at 93–97 (cited in note 164).
166 Crenshaw, 11 Natl Black L J at 9 (cited in note 164).
167 Guinier, 6 Berkeley Women’s L J at 104 (cited in note 164).
168 Crenshaw, 11 Natl Black L J at 2–3 (cited in note 164).
169 Guinier, 6 Berkeley Women’s L J at 93 (cited in note 164).
170 See generally Maggie Blackhawk, On Power & Indian Country, 1 Women & L 39
(2020) (joint publication of the top sixteen law reviews).
171 Id at 43.
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capacities, talents, and the histories from which they may descend—requires no scholarly proof to be a matter of concern. In
that sense, Crenshaw, Guinier, and Blackhawk all highlight what
Purdy also focused on in his chapter on losing a country, albeit
from an outside perspective—the serious affective dimensions of
erasure that constitute an overlooked aspect of its social effects
and challenges. 172 The affective experiential challenges of erasure
must be at least as profound as that of realizing the erasure of
others’ experiences; and the attempt to counter erasures often requires disrupting people’s affective attachments to frameworks
and worldviews built upon them.
What we learn from considering the familiar priorities of representation and perspective as part of the question of historical
erasure and its impact on the legal field and scholarship are some
important lessons about precisely the problems that Purdy sets
out as the topic of his book—the challenges of speaking across differences to build a commons. The lessons (in reverse order of this
Review’s discussion) are as follows: 1) individuals feel the harm
of erasure and resistance to it on a deeply personal level, so that
the attempt to communicate across chasms of presumptions often
diverts to those feelings instead of to the underlying intellectual
question; and 2) as a result of many sedimented layers that produce the erasure of specific histories at the root of these disagreements, we lack a great deal of information that could inform our
common understandings of the institutions that govern us at both
a factual and conceptual level. A general presumption of erasure
of the histories of conquest, slavery, and race in the main fields of
law, such as those studied by first-years, would greatly facilitate
the common project of understanding the common terms of their
legacies. As part of this endeavor, revisiting the problem of perspective as central to inquiries about the composition of fields of
law clarifies why representation must be central too. For it is the
missing voices of the figures erased from our history—what they
did as well as what happened to them—and the voices of the people who care about them and resist their erasure (whether because they descend from them, or for other reasons, have not believed in their absence and pursue their stories) that make it
possible to tell the story of how conquest, slavery, and their
172 Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 55–75 (cited in note 1). See also text accompanying notes 137–53.
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aftermath produced our past and our present, both in legal institutions and outside of them.
The structural importance of erasure also highlights some
frequently overlooked aspects of the significance of representation. Extending the questions of perspective and representation
historically often reveals new information about the ways that
minorities used, changed, and shaped the law. Understanding
how our legal system grew out of the histories of conquest and
slavery does not merely mean recovering the histories of the violence they enacted, facilitated, and legitimated. While Purdy
acknowledges the violence of racist representations, 173 his account
could more deeply engage with what representation means beyond acknowledging violence and unevenly distributed harm.
Early in the book, he suggests that “our civic enmity” 174
is a matter of some people starting to see what many others
have known for a long time: that, depending on who you are,
the police are dangerous, the courthouse is a menace, the official statues are civic graffiti and insults; that la migra, ICE,
will grab and expel with one American hand the same migrants
that the other hand, the economic sectors of building and cleaning and harvesting, has been beckoning and exploiting. 175
In keeping with this summary, the nonwhites who he names
mostly suffer and absorb the violence of racism in his text: 176 Samuel Oliver-Bruno is arrested; 177 Professor Pauli Murray suffered

173 “Settlers,” Purdy asserts in his introduction, “made indigenous Americans into a
kind of narrative resource, a flexible key to imagining ways of being ‘the land’s.’” Purdy,
This Land Is Our Land at xviii (cited in note 1). “[D]ifferential violence”—violence distributed unevenly to different groups in part as a consequence of law—“molds white, black,
and brown bodies to the concrete abstractions of race and caste.” Id at xvi.
174 Id at 1.
175 Id at 2.
176 Other than President Barack Obama, who is mentioned sporadically, see id at 10,
17, 23, 102, the exceptions to this rule are the following individuals: Bayard Rustin, id at
xiv (has a political idea); Ta-Nehisi Coates, id at xv (has a critique); Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, id at 102–06 (advocates for the Green New Deal); and Professor Aziz
Rana, id at 110 (has a historical insight). While Purdy mentions no Native people by name,
when he refers to them collectively it is often in the same register, in keeping with the
observation that “American Indians and Indigenous people are all too often solely associated with loss—whether it be our lands or our lives.” Mishuana Goeman, The Land Introduction: Beyond the Grammar of Settler Landscapes and Apologies, 73 W Humanities Rev
*4 (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author).
177 See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at viii (cited in note 1). Oliver-Bruno was later
deported. See Meagan Flynn, Feds Deport Undocumented Immigrant Whose Church
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multiple forms of oppression as a child in the Jim Crow South; 178
and Anthony Burns is re-enslaved. 179 Before his eventual deportation, however, Oliver-Bruno lived in a church for almost a year
as possibly the most famous figurehead of the recent revival of
the sanctuary church movement. 180 Murray, among other accomplishments, supplied arguments that Justices Thurgood Marshall
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg drew upon for landmark cases that
transformed US law in the twentieth century. 181 Burns was a
preacher who eventually obtained freedom and left some record
of his thoughts. 182 After his removal under the Fugitive Slave Act
from Boston, which provoked massive protests, 183 Burns was imprisoned in Richmond, which permanently damaged his health,
and then sold to a North Carolina slave trader. 184 In 1855, a group
of Boston African Americans led by Leonard Grimes purchased
his freedom for $1,300. 185 Burns studied theology at Oberlin, drew
on his experiences to campaign against slavery in New England,
and moved to preach in Baptist churches in Indianapolis and then
Saint Catharines, Upper Canada, where he died in 1862, at only
twenty-eight years of age. 186
Supporters Went to Jail to Protect Him (Wash Post, Nov 30, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/YKH5-KW2Z.
178 See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at xxvi, 41–42 (cited in note 1).
179 See id at 58.
180 See Flynn, Feds Deport Undocumented Immigrant (cited in note 177); Catherine
E. Shoichet, They Thought Living in Churches Would Protect Them. Now They Fear Nowhere Is Safe (CNN, Dec 22, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/W7QL-ALVA.
181 See Kathryn Schulz, The Many Lives of Pauli Murray, (The New Yorker, Apr 10,
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/AXX9-5CUG. As a law student, Murray wrote a paper
that her professor passed on to the legal team that argued Brown v Board of Education;
347 US 483 (1954), she wrote a nearly 750-page treatise on state segregation laws that
the ACLU and the NAACP widely distributed and used; she helped found the National
Organization for Women; and she furnished arguments that then-advocate Ruth Bader
Ginsburg used to argue that the Equal Protection Clause applied to women, among other
accomplishments. See id.
182 See Paul Finkelman, Anthony Burns (1834–1862) (Library of Virginia, 2001), archived at https://perma.cc/2RNH-FHL5.
183 See id. During the course of which a newly deputized marshal was killed; Burns’s
removal required more than 1,500 troops and between $40,000 and $50,000 of government
spending. See id.
184 See id.
185 See id. In 1856, Charles Emery Stevens published an account of Burns’s arrest,
re-enslavement, and liberation. See generally Charles Emery Stevens, Anthony Burns: A
History (Jewett 1856).
186 Finkelman, Anthony Burns (cited in note 182). It is also possible to know something of his thoughts: upon his arrest in Boston, he initially refused the help of an antislavery lawyer, believing his return to Virginia inevitable, but was eventually convinced
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Of course, highlighting historical racial violence is crucial for
many reasons. We must grapple with the human costs of our institutions, the extent of which we are still uncovering and learning. A clear-eyed look at past institutional development sheds
light on the logic and dynamics of institutions, systems, and practices that continue to operate in the present. However, even during the periods most famous for racial violence, such as the land
grabs of the eighteenth century, the antebellum period, and Jim
Crow, nonwhites survived those challenges and acted in ways
that shaped the world. They engaged with those systems in ordinary, inventive, and subversive ways, participated in them as
they could to gain advantages, and challenged them directly, individually and en masse. 187 All of this activity both shaped our institutions and furnishes rich lessons about human resiliency, the
kinds of incentives institutions can create that foster or hamper
collective action and life, the strength of communities and their
traditions, and the structural limitations of institutions we have
built.
The absence of people of color from narratives in which they
acted therefore reinforces the erasure of their humanity and capacities; this is the legacy of both formal exclusions and harmful
stereotyping. In his chapter “The Long Environmental Justice
Movement,” 188 Purdy describes “the history of environmentalism,”
as “a microcosm of American history generally.” Yet, what he
means by that claim is especially perplexing with respect to the
question of representation. 189 Purdy structures the essay as an
address to the environmental justice movement’s critique that
mainstream environmental law organizations did not adequately
attend to questions of distribution, or the disproportionate impact
of environmental harms on nonwhite and poor people. 190 Racism
to accept representation. See id. This information, unlike some of what I described above,
was not buried deep in the archive; rather, thanks to Paul Finkelman’s labor, it was immediately available through a Google search.
187 See, for example, Beryl Satter, Family Properties: Race, Real Estate, and the Exploitation of Black Urban America 272–320 (Henry Holt 2009) (describing the efforts of
the Contract Buyers League in the 1950s and 1960s, including payment strikes and legal
challenges); N.D.B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of
Jim Crow South Florida 19–43 (Chicago 2014) (discussing activities of Miami’s Colored
Board of Trade in the early twentieth century).
188 See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 102–40 (cited in note 1).
189 Id at 110.
190 See id at 108. Purdy lists two other parts of the movement’s critique in this distillation of its concerns—focus on the outdoors and nature preserves rather than
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appears to be its principal topic, and Purdy goes into relatively
extensive detail to name and describe the vitriolic racism of several early environmentalists, including Madison Grant, President
Theodore Roosevelt, Irving Fisher, Governor Gifford Pinchot, and
John Muir. 191 He then describes the beginning of the mainstream
environmental law movement, including the Sierra Club membership’s negative response to a poll asking if the Club should
concern itself with “the urban poor and ethnic minorities.” 192 He
does relate that “[i]n 1987, the United Church of Christ’s (UCC)
Commission for Racial Justice published an influential report
that . . . called th[e] unequal vulnerability [of minority communities to toxic exposure] ‘a form of racism.’” 193
Yet Purdy never mentions the great grassroots movements of
black communities, led by Dollie Burwell and Reverends Leon
White and Benjamin Chavis Jr, nor the UCC—which was also led
by Black women, Reverends Adora Iris Lee and Bernice Powell
Jackson—the organization that ultimately produced this report. 194 It would be equally difficult to know that it was this mass
movement of people of color who named their struggle “environmental justice” and popularized the term. This movement gathered in 1991 for the First National People of Color Environmental
Leadership Summit in Washington, DC, which produced a
neighborhoods and workplaces and overvaluation of litigation at the expense of popular
engagement—but only engages the first substantially in this essay. See id. Benjamin
Chavis’s work for the Commission of Racial Justice provides an illuminating scholarly
literature that details this historical debate. See United Church of Christ Commission for
Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites
(1987). See also generally Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice
Movement, 86 Cal L Rev 775 (1998); Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal
Meaning of a Social Movement, 15 J L & Commerce 597 (1996); Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 Fordham Urban L J 523
(1994); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw U L Rev 787 (1993). For a contrasting point of view,
see generally Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 Yale L J 1383 (1994).
191 See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 111–20 (cited in note 1).
192 Id.
193 Id at 120–21.
194 See Brooks Berndt, A Case for the Mother of the Environmental Justice Movement:
Dollie Burwell (United Church of Christ, Sept 20, 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/FZG9-ASQW (discussing the leadership roles of Burwell, White, and
Chavis). For the UCC’s report, see United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice,
Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States (cited in note 190).
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visionary document outlining a series of “principles of environmental justice.” 195 Under the leadership of the Congressional
Black Caucus, in 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) established the Environmental Equity Workgroup. 196 In
1992 and 1993, the EPA formed the Office of Environmental Equity and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council,
respectively. 197 And in 1994, President Bill Clinton renamed the
office as the Office of Environmental Justice and issued an executive order creating an Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice and requiring that each federal agency “make
achieving environmental justice part of its mission.” 198 In other
words, grassroots movements of communities of color, led mostly
by Black women and men, thereby succeeded in making environmental justice a federal agenda item. As an outsider to the field,
one of the most striking things about the extensive literature on
the environmental justice movement is its clear pride in memorializing the landmarks of its history, the diverse coalitions it built
across the country, and its leaders, including Professor Robert
Bullard—sometimes called the father of the environmental justice movement—and especially women leaders, such as Peggy
Shepard, Margie Eugene Richard, Professor Beverley Wright,
and many more. 199
195 See Robert D. Bullard and Glenn S. Johnson, Environmental Justice: Grassroots Activism and Its Impact on Public Policy Decision Making, 56 J Soc Issues 555, 556–57 (2000).
196 Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, Congressional Black Caucus Visit Oakland on Joint Environmental Justice Tour (Oct 16, 2010), archived at
https://perma.cc/5X3T-2ZAS.
197 See Bullard and Johnson, 56 J Soc Issue at 560 (cited in note 195).
198 Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 3 CFR 859 (1995). See also Dina GilioWhitaker, As Long as Grass Grows: The Indigenous Fight for Environmental Justice, From
Colonization to Standing Rock 20 (Beacon 2019).
199 For examples of this type of literature, see generally Robert D. Bullard, Dumping
in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (Westview 1990); Robert D. Bullard, ed,
The Quest for Environmental Justice: Human Rights and the Politics of Pollution (Sierra
Club 2005); Robert D. Bullard, ed, Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the
Grassroots (South End 1993); Bunyan Bryant, ed, Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies,
and Solutions (Island 1995); Laura Westra and Bill E. Lawson, eds, Faces of Environmental Racism: Confronting Issues of Global Justice (Rowman & Littlefield 2d ed 2001). See
also Foster, 86 Cal L Rev at 775 (cited in note 190) (including a detailed recounting of a
poor African-American community’s efforts to save their community from the proliferation
of toxic waste facilities); Cole, 21 Fordham Urban L J at 523 (cited in note 190). For a
closer examination of the role that women of color have played in the environmental justice
movement, see Robert D. Bullard and Damu Smith, Women Warriors of Colors on the Front
Line, in Robert D. Bullard, ed, The Quest for Environmental Justice 62–84 (highlighting
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It is difficult to guess why none of this history appears in
Purdy’s account of the environmental justice movement, especially given the concerns he repeatedly expresses about structural
racism, perspective, and erasure. Instead, pivoting from his specific descriptions of early environmentalists’ racism (which apparently inspired both Adolf Hitler and an anti-immigrant killer of
sixty-nine young Labour party members in Norway in 2011), 200
Purdy swiftly declares that “there is another history of environmentalism” that can prevent us from being “trapped by our history of self-division.” 201 The alternative genealogy he then offers
is another series of early white environmentalists who did not advocate for race science and genocide; 202 instead, they gave some
consideration to cities, factory workers, and chemicals. One man,
Robert Marshall, even participated in “reforms that increased the
sovereignty and cultural autonomy of Native American nations.” 203 Purdy finally returns to the environmental justice movement’s criticisms of major environmental law institutions, to declare that “[l]eaving out distribution” was a mistake made in
“good faith,” because in the early 1970s, those organizations had
good reason to believe that the world would only grow more
equal. 204 In “this time of fresh mobilization and new alliance,” he
reclaims the term “environmental justice movement” for a “long”
movement that has grown from the genealogy he has described. 205
In closing, Purdy notes that “[e]conomic power, racial inequality,
and the struggles of Indigenous peoples are not optional or supplemental. They are at the heart of the work. They have always
been.” 206 Yet nowhere does he engage with the rich literature by
Indigenous writers, who have not only ensured the survival of
their own histories of struggle, but also offer the fullest, most
deeply developed accounts that we have of how to relate to the

the roles of Wright, Emelda West, Susana R. Almanza, Sylvia Herrera, Professor Gail
Small, Cassandra Roberts, and Richard, among others, in leading communities in the fight
for environmental justice).
200 See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 113 (cited in note 1).
201 Id at 123.
202 See id at 123–28.
203 Id at 127.
204 See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 130 (cited in note 1).
205 See id at 123–24, 138.
206 Id at 140.
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land and one another beyond the framework of property and the
market. 207
Admittedly, a number of movements working for environmental justice predate and exceed this specific, well-known movement that popularized the term, as its own members and chroniclers concede. In the 1960s, for example, César Chávez organized
Mexican farmworkers in California not only to improve working
conditions, but also to combat pesticide abuse. 208 “The struggles
of indigenous peoples,” too, have indeed been at the heart of the
environmental justice movement for centuries, but at their heart
have also always been Indigenous leaders, and especially women
and youth, who all too frequently go unnamed and unrecognized
by people outside of their own communities. Some are nonetheless
well-known: the Zapatistas have been waging one of the most visible Indigenous resistances to toxic development in the world
since the 1990s; 209 the Ojibwe environmentalist Winona LaDuke
founded Honor the Earth, a national advocacy group encouraging
public support and funding for Native environmental groups in
1993; 210 and Ken Saro-Wiwa and, more recently, Berta Cáceres
famously lost their lives leading struggles for environmental justice. 211 In his book, Purdy mentions Standing Rock and Bears
207 See generally, for example, Goeman, 73 W Humanities Rev *1 (cited in note 176);
Nick Estes, Our History is the Future: Standing Rock Versus the Dakota Access Pipeline,
and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance (Verso 2019); Leanne Betasomasake
Simpson, As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom Through Radical Resistance
(Minnesota 2017); Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders
of Settler States (Duke 2014); Mishuana Goeman, From Place to Territories and Back
Again: Centering Storied Land in the Discussion of Indigenous Nation-Building, 1 Intl J
Critical Indigenous Stud 23 (2008); Jennifer Nez Denetdale, Reclaiming Diné History: The
Legacies of Navajo Chief Manuelito and Juanita (Arizona 2007); Ned Blackhawk, Violence
Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West (Harvard 2006); Winona
LaDuke, All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life (South End 1999); Mario
Gonzalez and Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, The Politics of Hallowed Ground: Wounded Knee and
the Struggle for Indian Sovereignty (Illinois 1999); Vine Deloria Jr, God is Red (Grosset &
Dunlap 1973).
208 See Laura Pulido, Environmentalism and Economic Justice: Two Chicano Struggles in the Southwest 114–20 (Arizona 1996).
209 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, An Environmental Justice Critique of Comparative Advantage: Indigenous Peoples, Trade Policy, and the Mexican Neoliberal Economic Reforms,
32 U Pa J Intl L 723, 730–31 (2011) (describing the Zapatista uprising as “an example of
fierce opposition by indigenous communities to . . . the neoliberal development strategies
that threaten indigenous lands, livelihoods, and lifeways”).
210 See Honor the Earth, About Us, archived at https://perma.cc/X6QZ-29ZH.
211 See John H. Knox, Michel Forst, and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Protecting Those Who
Work to Defend the Environment Is a Human Rights Issue (The Guardian, June 5, 2016),
archived at https://perma.cc/BY8Q-YFDN.
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Ears more than once, but in disembodied ways. 212 Yet Standing
Rock youth initiated the NoDAPL direct action protests; 213 LaDonna Brave Bull Allard and Joye Braun of the Indigenous Environmental Network then established the water protectors’
camp, 214 while David Archambault II led the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe through that period. 215 In July 2015, leaders from the Hopi
Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Pueblo of Zuni,
and Ute Indian Tribe formed the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition to protect the sacred, spiritual, historical, natural, scientific
and cultural resources of the lands. 216 That coalition and the nonprofit Utah Diné Bikéyah have been fighting against Trump’s reduction of the monument. 217
Purdy’s call to include everyone under the umbrella of “environmental justice” is an impetus and ethic that these groups and
individuals already share. They have, of course, their own genealogies of environmental justice predecessors, so it is not clear if
Purdy means to offer them an alternative, or to add the lineage
he constructs to theirs. Certainly the genealogy he constructs
here, on its own, feels out of sync with a youth-led environmental
movement that is rising globally. While this movement’s most famous face may be Greta Thunberg’s, it is constituted overwhelmingly by Indigenous youth and youth of color, 218 who are more
likely to find their inheritances and inspiration in the long legacies and resilience of Indigenous people and people of color who
have defended their communities and the Earth.
Those youth would likely notice, too, if they read his book,
that though Purdy frequently refers to racism, erasure, and the
disproportionate harms borne by communities of color throughout
his book, and though people of color organized and led many of
212 See, for example, Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 4–6, 23 (cited in note 1) (discussing Bears Ears); id at 102–03 (discussing the Dakota Access Pipeline).
213 Matt Petronzio, How Young Native Americans Built and Sustained the #NoDAPL
Movement (Mashable, Dec 7, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/29FB-V536.
214 Rebecca Bengal, Standing Rock Rising: Inside the Movement to Stop the Dakota
Access Pipeline (Vogue, Nov 22, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/Y45N-34J4.
215 Sam Levin, Standing Rock Chairman Looks to History as Divisions Emerge Among
Activists (The Guardian, Feb 13, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/9PLJ-A2WT.
216 Bears
Ears
Inter-Tribal
Coalition,
Who
We
Are,
archived
at
https://perma.cc/M6UR-2RJ5.
217 See Zak Podmore, Native Americans Win Elections in Utah After Voicing Support
for Bears Ears (Sierra, Nov 15, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/5MVJ-MFX5.
218 See Maia Wikler and Thanu Yakupitiyage, 11 Young Climate Justice Activists You
Need to Pay Attention To (Vice, Oct 1, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/482V-J3SZ.
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the movements and issues that he describes, the number of people
of color he names does not exceed the fingers on my two hands,
and includes no Indigenous people. The few named individuals
who act in the text, rather than just suffer, are some of the most
visible people of color in the world—President Barack Obama,
Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Reverend Jesse Jackson, and Ta-Nehisi Coates. 219 Perhaps Purdy is neither speaking
to those youth nor to the people who are not reflected in his accounts of the movements he describes. Perhaps his audience is
the community of people, like him, who felt they lost their country; who have recently felt the disorientation of their own limited
perspective; who he worries will turn to cynicism and nihilism
from that emotional disturbance instead of a collective, common
cause. Perhaps his audience is a group of people he hopes to bring
into a broader movement, not those who are already inside of one,
building and leading it.
Purdy’s appreciation of the total, affective, and embodied nature of perspective also illuminates why speaking across different
perspectives, built on different understandings of the world, often
presents such an insoluble challenge. Yet similarly, recognizing
the limits of one’s own perspective, and that others who experience erasure also have perspectives, are perhaps the necessary
requisites for engaging substantively in conversations one has
never had before. Engaging with critical race studies scholarship,
which long ago described the holistic importance of representation, 220 might have inspired Purdy to describe and also show his
audience how the contributions of the nonwhite individuals that
both appear and are subsumed in his book shaped the world that
he describes. An engagement with the literatures on the history
of conquest and slavery might have made the term “Commonwealth” feel too drenched in the history of the British Empire—
and in an English era that saw the consolidation of its colonial
enterprises in America and the creation of the Royal African Company—to serve as a banner term for movements led by Indigenous
peoples and the descendants of the enslaved. An engagement with
219 See Purdy, This Land Is Our Land at 17, 23 (cited in note 1) (Obama); id at 102–
06 (Ocasio-Cortez); id at 15 (Jackson); id at xv (Coates). See also text accompanying notes
176–84; note 176.
220 See generally, for example, Crenshaw, 11 Natl Black L J 1 (cited in note 164);
Guinier, 6 Berkeley Women’s L J 93 (cited in note 164). See also text accompanying notes
164–67.
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Indigenous scholars would have clarified that Indigenous claims
to political sovereignty and their traditional homelands remain
unmistakable and unbroken, and revealed how much the claim
that “this land is our land,” however innocently offered, appears
as an affront to those claims.
Purdy’s sense of a possessory interest in land is not a narrow,
individual one—but neither does it defer to Indigenous claims or
reflect Indigenous concepts. This absence is curious because
Purdy’s vision of the commons, leaving aside his genealogies, resonates strongly in many ways with Indigenous philosophies,
teachings, and writings, with which he does not engage but from
which he could draw insight and begin to build real relations.
Potawatami scholar and scientist Robin Wall Kimmerer, for example, uses the Haudenosaunee idea of “One Bowl and One
Spoon,” which teaches that “the gifts of the earth are all in one
bowl, all to be shared from a single spoon”; according to this
worldview, earth “exists not as private property, but as a commons, to be tended with respect and reciprocity for the benefit of
all.” 221 As a starting point, in light of Indigenous claims and concepts, as a non-Indigenous person, the conversation must begin
precisely with the recognition that this land is not our land. While
the hundreds of different Native Nations in America hold different mythologies about the land and different traditions of land
tenure, there is a common baseline, which LaDuke captures when
she writes: “It is not our land. It is the land to which we belong.” 222
The value of representation is not the tokenistic inclusion or
acknowledgment of different bodies, but rather, beginning a relationship in which these bodies might listen to and learn from one
another. In legal scholarship, the challenge of working in the
space of erasure is to integrate literatures containing erasures
with the works that offer the stories that literature does not contain. The importance of representation—of different types of
sources, containing different perspectives—lies in the possibility
of a true exchange and growth from that exchange. Tonawanda
Band of Seneca scholar Mishuana Goeman recently reflected on
the difference between a limited “acknowledgment” and approaching this richer, more substantive relationship in the
221 Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass 376 (Milkweed 2013) (quotation
marks omitted).
222 Winona LaDuke, The Winona LaDuke Reader: A Collection of Essential Writings
147 (Voyageur 2002).
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context of tribal land acknowledgments, writing: “Perhaps we
should not . . . understand[ ] these processes of stating whose
lands you are on as a land acknowledgement but think of a placebased, community consulted understanding of whose land we are
on as a Land introduction. That leaves [open] so many relations
and places to grow.” 223
The goal of building our fractured narratives into a place of
exchange and mutual respect is indeed an urgent one, in which
many people, coming from different perspectives, and in their own
ways, are working to tend. The work of difficult conversations is
the work of cultivating the commons of Purdy’s dreams. In that
respect, his account feels like an accurate index of the many ways
in which that conversation has begun and progressed, and also,
of the space where it has room, in our current moment, in Goeman’s positive framing, to grow.
CONCLUSION
This Book Review has proceeded in the spirit of Professor
Purdy’s exhortation to shoulder the challenge of building unity at
a time when the grim consequences of denying our interconnectedness are visible in stark relief and quickly magnifying across
the globe. In taking up this work, it agrees with Purdy that beginning with the history of the nation and the land on which we
reside—the great violence and the erasure of that history—is key
to understanding that challenge and each other. It parts ways
with Purdy where it perceives that here, with his proclamation
that “this land is our land” and his call for a “commonwealth,” he
replicates a specific failure to practice real inclusion within a universalizing vision that has perennially plagued left/liberal movements and hampered their ability to build effective coalitions. In
order to bring people together, acknowledging their diverse experiences should be the beginning of a process of learning from experiences outside one’s own, and being willing to rethink even the
norms and ideals that one holds most dear. Because people have
not had the same experiences, the challenges of this conversation
are not the same for everyone. The task for someone used to having a voice is not to solve the problem of how to speak for people
223 Personal Correspondence from Mishuana Goeman, Associate Professor, University of California, Los Angeles, to K-Sue Park, Author (on file with author). See also generally Goeman, 73 W Humanities Rev *1 (cited in note 176).
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accustomed to having their histories and perspectives erased; it
is to learn to listen and to hold a true dialogue with them. Insofar
as that conversation concerns the particular histories of the land
and the law that shape our lives in common, there is much left for
all of us to learn, and it is imperative that we do it together.
This Review has therefore also reflected on the related and
particular task of building legal scholarship from suppressed historical foundations: understanding the ramifications of the histories of conquest and slavery for law and legal scholarship is an
ongoing and incomplete process, one that requires enormous and
particular labor that is not widely or well understood. Scholarship
on erasures so far suggests that they are ubiquitous across doctrinal fields, and it offers a more precise understanding of the
mechanisms by which they occur. Taking erasure as an object of
scholarly inquiry is challenging in many ways, and obliges us to
consider a different approach to methodology and the idea of a
field: it is hard to find the stories we have lost because it is almost
impossible to know when a positive representation of facts contains an erasure, or that an archive could represent only one set
of experiences with a part of the law, and where else other information, if it exists, is to be found. Furthermore, curing erasure
means researching buried stories, but also coming to understand
that the conventions of one’s canons and the ideals that may
structure one’s political imagination may also be limited by the
failure to appreciate other experiences and other perspectives,
whether because the stories have been inaccessible or because
traditional institutional practices have cast them as peripheral,
unimportant, and invisible. Nonetheless, the traces of erasure, its
symptoms and patterns, are also everywhere.
The work of understanding the significance of historical erasure from the study of law requires putting stories from the archive
into conversation with the theoretical frameworks that omitted
them and the scholarship that furnishes the intersecting histories
and theoretical frameworks that help explain them. This work of
synthesis presents the process of reaching a collective understanding of the history of our institutions, the positive constitution of our legal systems, and our social world. These observations
proceed in the spirit of Purdy’s effort to build common ground on
which to reach a collective understanding of how we arrived in
the riven present. The rising volume of the conversation about
these histories outside of the legal academy means that legal
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scholars who take up this challenge come into dialogue in new
ways not only with one another but also with the public. If we do
not, the rifts between that public and the legal academy—as well
as the parts of the legal academy that reference increasingly different versions of American history in their teaching and scholarship—will widen.
This Review calls for a general presumption of erasure that
would put us on notice that accepted accounts of the law that bear
no trace of the foundational histories of conquest, slavery, and the
deeply racialized transactional world that followed in their wake
may represent conclusions drawn from an incomplete record. We
should further reexamine the conceptual norms, ideals, and practical conventions that emerged from incomplete, whitewashed
narratives about the historical development of American law.
These conventional norms and ideals that appear “raceless” have
spread beyond the parts of legal scholarship, teaching, and practice that focus on historical research. At the same time, the racism
that stems from these histories, in ways that we continue to learn
more about, remains rife in these spheres in many dimensions.
We fail to perceive the connection between segregation in thinking and in our communities at our peril—once more, at the cost of
understanding the institutions that govern us and how we might
remake them. Because law and legal thinking have helped shape
the world we live in, the legacies of these omissions hold significant stakes for people everywhere; their stakes are epistemological, scholarly, material, and practical, all at once. One of the
greatest rewards, as well as challenges, of articulating the significance of these histories to law in ways that might channel new
insights into effective collective action toward the goal of transformative change.

